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THE SONG REMAINS THE SAME: WHAT CYBERLAW MIGHT 
TEACH THE NEXT INTERNET ECONOMY
Kevin Werbach*
Abstract
The next stage of the digital economy will involve trillions of 
networked devices across every industry and sphere of human activity: 
The Internet of the World. Early manifestations of this evolution through 
on-demand services such as Uber and Airbnb raise a host of serious legal 
questions. The stage seems set for a decisive battle between regulation 
and innovation. Yet this perception is mistaken. In the end, the emerging 
businesses will welcome government engagement, and regulatory actors 
will accept creative solutions to achieve their goals. Why expect such a 
resolution? Because the same story played out twenty years ago, in the 
early days of the commercial internet. 
Contemporary debates recapitulate a familiar error: the artificial 
division of virtual and real-space activity. Now, as in the past, this “digital 
dichotomy” feeds both excessive skepticism about legal protections and
excessive concern about the threats from technology-based innovations. 
The history of cyberlaw shows the importance of overcoming such 
perceptions and recognizing the potential of government as an enabler of 
innovation.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, the internet’s1 sphere of influence has 
grown from a few million personal computers using dial-up modems to 
billions of smartphones and broadband connections around the globe.2 It 
is hard to imagine the internet becoming any more significant, even as 
that significance grows. The next stage of the digital ecosystem will 
involve trillions of networked devices, across every industry and sphere 
of human activity: The Internet of the World. Early manifestations of this 
evolution raise serious legal questions about regulatory classification, 
taxation, consumer protection, and a variety of other controversies.3 The 
                                                                                                                     
1. Although many style guides still capitalize the word “internet,” there is an ongoing 
debate as to whether the term should be considered a proper noun. See Adam Nathaniel Peck, 
Stop Capitalizing the Word Internet, NEW REPUBLIC (July 28, 2015), 
https://newrepublic.com/article/122384/stop-capitalizing-word-internet. In fact, the continued 
capitalization illustrates one of the themes of this Article: the perception of the internet as a new 
and exotic technology long after it became mainstream. 
2. See Internet Users, INTERNET LIVE STATS, http://www.internetlivestats.com/internet-
users/#trend (last visited Feb. 27, 2017) (showing global internet users growing from 
approximately 25 million in 1994 to 3 billion in 2014). 
3. See Rashmi Dyal-Chand, Regulating Sharing: The Sharing Economy as an Alternative 
Capitalist System, 90 TUL. L. REV. 241, 245 (2015) (discussing regulatory issues in the sharing 
economy); Vanessa Katz, Regulating the Sharing Economy, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1067, 1068–
2
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stage seems set for a decisive battle between regulation and innovation.4
Yet this perception is mistaken. In the end, emerging businesses will 
welcome government engagement, and regulatory actors will accept 
creative solutions to achieve their goals. Why expect such a resolution? 
Because the same story played out twenty years ago, in the early days of 
the commercial internet.
Three of today’s most-heralded technology trends—the On-Demand 
(or Sharing) Economy, the Internet of Things, and Big Data—are actually 
components of the same phenomenon. The digital economy is 
increasingly incorporating systems, business processes, and objects into
its chaotic dynamism. Predictably, those involved claim that everything 
is different now and that rules impeding their efforts are vestiges of 
ignorance best ignored. Their customers, competitors, and erstwhile 
regulators are not so sure. Debates increasingly rage over whether rules 
designed for legacy industries should control novel services such as Uber 
and Airbnb. 
Both sides exaggerate the dangers. Progress requires recognizing that
government is as much the solution as it is the problem, perhaps more so. 
Legal regimes exist to protect certain values. If those regimes fail, the 
answer is not to abandon the values; it is to adapt the legal institutions or 
develop new regimes more reliant on market forces, norms, or 
technology. Regulation can evolve, but only once regulators and 
regulated engage with one another in good faith. The longer the pattern 
of oversteer persists, the greater the cost to innovation, on one side, or 
societal values, on the other. If anything, the innovators stand to lose the 
most by delaying government involvement in adopting reasonable 
solutions. Leading on-demand providers are already beginning to 
recognize this.
                                                                                                                     
69 (2015) (discussing solutions to problems with regulation in the sharing economy); Stephen R. 
Miller, First Principles for Regulating the Sharing Economy, 53 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 147, 149
(2016) (discussing local government regulation of sharing economies); Abbey Stemler, Betwixt
and Between: Regulating the Shared Economy, 43 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 31, 33 (2016) (discussing 
how the sharing economy “does not fit within existing legal frameworks”); Molly Cohen & Corey 
Zehngebot, What’s Old Becomes New: Regulating the Sharing Economy, BOS. B.J. (Apr. 1, 2014),
https://bostonbarjournal.com/2014/04/01/whats-old-becomes-new-regulating-the-sharing-
economy/ (discussing legal issues raised by the sharing economy). See generally Benjamin G.
Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies and Regulatory Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate 
Companies Like Airbnb and Uber?, 19 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 293 (2016) (discussing regulatory 
frameworks associated with Airbnb and Uber).
4. See, e.g., Sofia Ranchordás, Does Sharing Mean Caring? Regulating Innovation in the 
Sharing Economy, 16 MINN. J.L. SCI. & TECH. 413, 440–55 (2015) (advocating a new “innovation 
law” approach to on-demand services).
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The pattern is easy to spot in hindsight but difficult to recognize in the 
moment.5 Fortunately, history can serve as a guide. Retracing similar 
controversies and showing their parallels to current disputes can 
illuminate the pathway forward. It can also remind us of important 
theoretical perspectives that bear on current debates. The early years of 
internet commercialization were fertile ones not only for business 
entrepreneurs but also for intellectual entrepreneurs in the legal academy. 
In a seminal late-1990s exchange with Judge Frank Easterbrook, 
Professor Lawrence Lessig argued that the nascent field of cyberlaw
could help identify both policy challenges and their solutions.6 The same 
measures used to evaluate how technologies regulate, he asserted, could 
be used to assess conventional legal mechanisms, guiding the selection 
of the best approach in specific contexts.7 Lessig’s insight applies equally 
well to the Internet of the World. Questions about regulating (or not 
regulating) today’s innovative companies and business models parallel 
debates about online activity twenty years ago. What is needed are 
yardsticks to evaluate where government action should stop and private 
regulation by software algorithms begin, and vice versa. Lessig’s
proposed criteria prove surprisingly durable, despite the massive changes 
in the digital world. 
This Article traces the road to balance on the major public policy 
debates that began at the dawn of cyberlaw, roughly twenty years ago. It 
demonstrates how the fundamental issues then are in fact the fundamental 
issues now; only the players have changed. And it identifies how the 
lessons of history—even recent history—can help overcome current 
challenges. It proceeds as follows.8 Part I summarizes the emerging 
trends shaping the next stage of the internet ecosystem, in particular the 
spectacular growth of on-demand services such as Uber, Lyft, and 
Airbnb. Part II recounts the birth of cyberlaw in the 1990s and explains
the structure of debates over the proper legal response to online services 
                                                                                                                     
5. The neo-Schumpeterian technology scholar Carlota Perez makes a similar argument 
with a much broader scope, describing fifty-year cycles of economic, political, financial, and 
social responses to major technological upheavals. See generally CARLOTA PEREZ,
TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTIONS AND FINANCIAL CAPITAL (2003) (describing a pattern of boom, 
bust, and renewal across five technological revolutions). Central to Perez’s framework is a 
“turning point,” where the excesses of early exuberance are reined in with the help of regulation.
See id. at 114–26. 
6. Compare Lawrence Lessig, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach, 113 
HARV. L. REV. 501, 501–02 (1999) (arguing that cyberlaw offers unique and valuable 
perspectives), with Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the Horse, 1996 U. CHI.
LEGAL F. 207, 208 (arguing that “we do not know whether many features of existing law are 
optimal”).
7. See Lessig, supra note 6, at 502–03.
8. The author begs the reader’s indulgence for naming the Article after a Led Zeppelin 
album, while employing Beatles songs for the section headings.
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and e-commerce. Part III traces contemporary developments in four key 
policy areas: regulatory classification, competition policy, taxation or 
fees, and platform responsibility. Part IV draws out lessons for moving 
toward healthy solutions for today’s policy challenges.
I. COME TOGETHER: THE INTERNET OF THE WORLD 
The next stage of the digital economy does not yet have a widely 
accepted name, but its outlines are well established. It is the 
transformation of every form of economic activity along the same lines 
as the internet. This phenomenon appears at the intersection of three 
highly visible trends: the On-Demand Economy, the Internet of Things, 
and Big Data. Each represents huge innovation potential and vast market 
opportunities. Together they signify a global sea-change that will 
penetrate every sector of the economy. Just as electronic commerce, 
online communications, and digital content distribution transformed 
markets beginning in the late 1990s, broadband and social networks in 
the early 2000s, and mobile services in the late 2000s, the Internet of the 
World will disrupt existing industries and create new ones. It will also 
pose dramatic challenges for both business and the law.
A. Revolution on Demand
Providers in the On-Demand Economy use the internet to liberate and 
aggregate spare capacity, through new platforms that respond to demand 
in real time.9 For example, Turo (formerly RelayRides) lets people rent 
out their cars, giving the owners some extra cash and renters access to a 
wider range of rentals and pickup locations than car-rental fleets.10
Instacart delivers groceries from local supermarkets through a network of
part-time and independent workers.11 Prosper enables peer-to-peer (P2P)
                                                                                                                     
9. See RACHEL BOTSMAN & ROO ROGERS, WHAT’S MINE IS YOURS xvi (2010); ROBIN 
CHASE, PEERS INC 2 (2015); Russell Belk, You Are What You Can Access: Sharing and 
Collaborative Consumption Online, 67 J. BUS. RES. 1595, 1595 (2014); Raj Kapoor, Lessons from 
the Sharing Economy, TECHCRUNCH (Aug. 30, 2014), http://techcrunch.com/2014/08/30/critical-
lessons-from-the-sharing-economy; The Rise of the Sharing Economy, ECONOMIST (Mar. 9, 2013), 
http://www.economist.com/news/leaders/21573104-internet-everything-hire-rise-sharing-
economy. A related development, most notable in China, is the growth of offline-to-online (O2O) 
services. See Juro Osawa, Startups That Merge Online and Offline Services Are Sweeping China,
WALL ST. J. (Apr. 4, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2014/04/04/online-services-go-
offline-in-china.
10. Alex Konrad, With $47 Million and a New Name, Car-Sharing Startup RelayRides 
Seeks Rebirth, FORBES (Nov. 4, 2015, 1:10 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/alexkonrad/
2015/11/04/with-47-million-and-a-new-name-car-sharing-startup-relayrides-seeks-rebirth/.
11. Brad Stone, Instacart Reclassifies Part of Its Workforce amid Regulatory Pressure on 
Uber, BLOOMBERG (June 22, 2015, 3:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-
06-22/instacart-reclassifies-part-of-its-workforce-amid-regulatory-pressure-on-uber. Instacart 
5
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lending without going through a traditional financial institution.12 And 
the most prominent examples, Uber and Airbnb, offer immediate access 
to local transportation and short-term lodging in cities around the world.13
These companies generally do not own the assets to which they offer 
access. Instead, they create virtual marketplaces using the internet and 
mobile devices.14
The trend is often labeled the Sharing Economy or Collaborative 
Consumption,15 but these are misnomers. The sector’s significant 
businesses are aggregate marketplaces of atomic services; little altruistic 
sharing occurs.16 Uber drivers, for example, don’t just happen to be in the 
                                                                                                                     
originally used only independent contractors, but it recently reclassified some of them as 
employees. Id.
12. See Michael J. de la Merced, Prosper Marketplace Raises $165 Million in Latest 
Funding Round, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
04/09/business/dealbook/prosper-marketplace-raises-165-million-in-latest-funding-round.html.
13. See AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2017); UBER,
http://www.uber.com (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
14. See The Rise of the Sharing Economy, supra note 9; cf. CHASE, supra note 9, at 3.
15. See BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 9, at xv; Belk, supra note 9, at 1595; The Rise of 
the Sharing Economy, supra note 9.
16. See Andrew Leonard, “Sharing Economy” Shams: Deception at the Core of the 
Internet’s Hottest Businesses, SALON (Mar. 14, 2014, 7:43 AM), 
http://www.salon.com/2014/03/14/sharing_economy_shams_deception_at_the_core_of_the_inte
rnets_hottest_businesses/; Christopher Mims, How Everyone Gets the “Sharing” Economy 
Wrong, WALL. ST. J. (May 24, 2015, 3:32 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/how-everyone-gets-
the-sharing-economy-wrong-14 32495921; Natasha Singer, Twisting Words to Make ‘Sharing’ 
Apps Seem Selfless, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/08/09/
technology/twisting-words-to-make-sharing-apps-seem-selfless.html; Brad Tuttle, Can We Stop 
Pretending the Sharing Economy Is All About Sharing?, TIME (June 30, 2014), http://time.com/ 
money/2933937/sharing-economy-airbnb-uber-monkey parking/.
“On-Demand Economy” is one of the other terms growing in prominence to better describe 
the phenomenon. See Jeff John Roberts, As “Sharing Economy” Fades, These 2 Phrases Are 
Likely to Replace It, FORTUNE (July 29, 2015, 8:20 AM), http://fortune.com/2015/07/ 29/sharing-
economy-chart/. From a user’s perspective, the key innovation of Uber, Airbnb, and similar 
services is that they make resources available instantaneously via mobile connections.
The true Sharing Economy is a real phenomenon. Non-profits, socially-oriented companies, 
and governments promote digital systems that make it easier to share both goods and services. 
See BOTSMAN & ROGERS, supra note 9, at xv; CHASE, supra note 9, at 2. However, these activities 
are naturally smaller-scale than the corporate on-demand platforms that are ultimately dedicated 
to maximizing revenues and profits. Real sharing requires thicker personal relationships, which 
are harder to divorce from local geographies and personal interaction. See Yochai Benkler,
Sharing Nicely: On Sharable Goods and the Emergence of Sharing as a Modality of Economic 
Production, 114 YALE L.J. 273, 275–76 (2004). The growing prominence of on-demand 
companies that are not truly about sharing has also provoked objections from organizations more 
committed to the pro-social benefits of shared consumption. See Nancy Cook, In Search of the 
Anti-Uber, ATLANTIC (Aug. 1, 2015), http://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2015/08/uber-
sharing-economy-roots/400187.
6
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neighborhood with empty seats in their cars.17 The distinctive feature of 
Uber is that anyone with a car can become a driver-for-hire on demand, 
and anyone seeking a ride can get one on demand. 
On-demand providers replicate the immediacy and rapid scalability of
e-commerce services such as Netflix or Amazon. Enterprises have done 
similar things for many years within their sphere of control, through 
enterprise resource planning and supply chain management software 
systems. The innovation is that on-demand services are not limited to 
assets they own or control. Instead of shipping some bits over a wire or 
putting a box from a warehouse on a truck, these services can direct 
otherwise-independent people and objects. 
Using software and networks to manage physical assets, digital 
systems can tokenize and manipulate real-world resources. The software 
representation of the asset effectively becomes the asset. Noted venture 
capitalist Marc Andreessen calls this phenomenon “software . . . eating 
the world.”18 Early Facebook executive Matt Cohler, also now a venture 
capitalist, refers to it as “remote controls for real life.”19 Touch a 
computer-generated map on your smartphone, and in a few minutes, a 
real car (with a real driver) appears in front of you in the real world. 
So, companies such as Uber and Airbnb may be examples of another 
oft-discussed technology megatrend: the Internet of Things.20 The 
Internet of Things, or IoT, involves network connectivity for devices 
other than personal computers, phones, and tablets.21 Most IoT 
                                                                                                                     
17. Unless otherwise noted, this Article focuses on the UberX service, which is the source 
of the bulk of Uber’s revenue and activity. Uber has begun offering a carpooling service, 
UberPool, which offers shared rides. However, it still uses drivers who, as with traditional taxis, 
are specifically looking to pick up riders for a fee. See Alex, Announcing UberPool, UBER 
NEWSROOM (Aug. 5, 2014), https://newsroom.uber.com/announcing-uberpool/.
18. Marc Andreessen, Why Software Is Eating the World, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 20, 2011), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424053111903480904576512250915629460.
19. Matt Cohler, Great Mobile Apps Are Remote Controls for Real Life, TECHCRUNCH
(Sept. 21, 2012), http://techcrunch.com/2012/09/21/great-mobile-apps-are-remote-controls-for-
real-life/.
20. Others have made this connection, notably tech publisher and conference organizer Tim 
O’Reilly. See Quentin Hardy, Tim O’Reilly Explains the Internet of Things, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 4, 
2015, 7:00 AM), http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/ 02/04/tim-oreilly-explains-the-internet-of-
things/ (listing Uber as an example of an Internet of Things company).
21. See DAVE EVANS, THE INTERNET OF THINGS: HOW THE NEXT EVOLUTION OF THE 
INTERNET IS CHANGING EVERYTHING 2, 4 (2011), http://www.cisco.com/web/about/ac79/docs/
innov/IoT_IBSG_0411FINAL.pdf; William H. Dutton, The Internet of Things 4 (June 20, 2013)
(unpublished manuscript), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2324902; Neil 
Gershenfeld & JP Vasseur, As Objects Go Online: The Promise (and Pitfalls) of the Internet of 
Things, FOREIGN AFFAIRS (Mar./Apr. 2014), http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/140745/neil-
gershenfeld-and-jp-vasseur/as-objects-go-online; Charles McLellan, M2M and the Internet of 
Things: A Guide, ZDNET (Jan. 10, 2013, 9:27 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/m2m-and-the-
internet-of-things-a-guide.
7
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discussions focus on small “things” such as sensors, environmental 
monitors, wearables, and medical devices, or on making large industrial 
systems such as supply chains and power grids “smart.”22 But the core 
idea is more than this. IoT means turning anything not traditionally a 
computing device into a network-aware source of data collection or 
manipulation.23 That aggregates individual devices into networked 
systems, which in turn can shape their actions.24 As with the On-Demand 
Economy, this process is experiencing phenomenal growth rates. Cisco 
predicts that by 2020, there will be 50 billion non-computing devices 
connected to the internet, many times the number of PCs and 
smartphones.25
In the case of Uber and Airbnb, the “things” being manipulated are 
cars and lodgings. They are not directly connected as with networked 
sensors; a smartphone or tablet serves as the interface that links the 
physical asset into the network, with a human in-between. From the 
user’s standpoint, however, this distinction is immaterial, and the 
companies hope to eliminate that inefficiency before long. Uber has 
partnered with Carnegie Mellon University to develop self-driving cars, 
a technology other companies such as Google and Tesla are also actively 
pursuing.26
The final element undergirding both the On-Demand Economy and 
the Internet of Things is Big Data.27 There are two components to the Big 
Data revolution.28 The first is the assembly of massive data sets of 
                                                                                                                     
22. See, e.g., Scott R. Peppet, Regulating the Internet of Things: First Steps Toward 
Managing Discrimination, Privacy, Security, and Consent, 93 TEX. L. REV. 85, 98 (2014)
(overviewing types of Internet of Things devices, including “health and fitness sensors, 
automobile black boxes, home monitors and smart grid sensors, devices designed specifically for 
employee monitoring, and software applications that make use of the sensors within today’s 
smartphones”).
23. Dutton, supra note 21, at 4.
24. Id. at 9–10. 
25. See EVANS, supra note 21.
26. Jack Stewart, Tesla’s Self-Driving Car Plan Seems Insane, but It Just Might Work,
WIRED (Oct. 24, 2016, 7:00 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/10/teslas-self-driving-car-plan-
seems-insane-just-might-work/; Rolfe Winkler & Douglas MacMillan, Uber Chases Google in 
Self-Driving Cars with Carnegie Mellon Deal, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 2, 2015, 10:23 PM), 
http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/ 02/02/uber-chases-google-in-self-driving-cars//.
27. Gil Allouche, Big Data and the Internet of Things: A Powerful Combination,
SMARTDATA COLLECTIVE (June 4, 2014), http://smartdatacollective.com/gilallouche/202371/big-
data-and-internet-things-powerful-combination.
28. See VIKTOR MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & KENNETH CUKIER, BIG DATA 19 (2013); see also
Steve Lohr, The Age of Big Data, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 11, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/
12/sunday-review/big-datas-impact-in-the-world.html?_r=0 (introducing the concept of Big Data 
as “[a] meme and a marketing term, for sure, but also shorthand for advancing trends in technology 
that open the door to a new approach to understanding the world and making decisions”).
8
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information about people and the world, thanks to the steady acceleration 
of digitization through the eras of mainframes, personal computers, 
mobile devices, and sensors.29 A key foundation for this activity is the 
emergence of cloud computing and networked data centers that can 
process vast amounts of data within the network.30 The second is the 
emergence of software, storage, and standards able to distill and analyze 
those data sets as a whole.31 The “big” in Big Data signifies that instead 
of the statistician’s traditional sample sets, entire data sets can be run 
through computer-driven algorithms, generating predictive models that 
find patterns in networks of correlations.32
The use of Big Data is important because the massive number of 
distributed connections embodied in the Internet of Things, tied to 
important societal systems through the On-Demand Economy, generates 
enormous amounts of data.33 Tracking a fleet of cars in a city in real time 
and anticipating changes in demand and supply to deliver a car to any 
location on demand in a few minutes is a phenomenally difficult 
challenge. Uber could not manage it without powerful real-time data 
analytics. The more physical location is involved, and the more telemetry 
and behavioral data are incorporated along with it, the greater the 
technical challenge but also the more powerful the services that can be 
delivered.
Companies taking advantage of the three interconnected trends are 
experiencing unbelievable growth.34 Roughly five years after it launched, 
Uber is the world’s most valuable private company, raising its latest 
funding round at a valuation of $62 billion.35 It now operates in over 300 
cities worldwide and has over one million drivers in its network.36 Its 
revenues are already in the billions of dollars and may hit $12.5 billion in 
                                                                                                                     
29. MAYER-SCHÖNBERGER & CUKIER, supra note 28, at 19.
30. See id. at 30.
31. Id. at 19. 
32. See id. at 31.
33. See Allouche, supra note 27; Hardy, supra note 20.
34. See Tomio Geron, Airbnb and the Unstoppable Rise of the Share Economy, FORBES
(Jan. 23, 2013, 7:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/tomiogeron/2013/01/23/airbnb-and-the-
unstoppable-rise-of-the-share-economy/; The Sharing Economy: How Will It Disrupt Your 
Business?, PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS (Aug. 2014), http://pwc.blogs.com/files/sharing-
economy-final_0814.pptx (predicting that five key Sharing Economy sectors could grow from 
$15 billion today to over $300 billion in revenues by 2025).
35. See Mike Isaac and Leslie Picker, Uber Valuation Put at $62.5 Billion After a New 
Investment Round, N.Y. TIMES: DEALBOOK BLOG (Dec. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/12/04/business/dealbook/uber-nears-investment-at-a-62-5-billion-valuation.html.
36. See Luz Lazo, Uber Turns 5, Reaches 1 Million Drivers and 300 Cities Worldwide. 
Now What?, WASH. POST (June 4, 2015), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/dr-
gridlock/wp/2015/06/04/uber-turns-5-reaches-1-million-drivers-and-300-cities-worldwide-now-
what/.
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2017.37 Airbnb is not far behind. Its valuation in its latest funding round 
exceeds $25 billion,38 and it has grown to over one million rooms 
worldwide, which is more than traditional hotel chains such as Marriott 
and Hilton provide.39 There are also several substantial ride-hailing40
competitors to Uber, including Lyft in the United States and Didi 
Chuxing in China, which are also valued in the billions of dollars.41
These providers are changing the way millions of people around the 
world find transportation and lodging. Some no longer own cars or stay 
in traditional hotels. And similar techniques are appearing in industry 
after industry. The brand council Crowd Companies tracks over 500 
funded companies in what it terms the Collaborative Economy.42 They 
operate in fields including financial services, communications, business 
services, pre-owned goods, and logistics.43
The potential scale of on-demand services is much greater than the 
legacy industries they challenge. In January 2015, Uber’s ride-hailing 
service was generating revenue in San Francisco at a $500 million annual 
run-rate, more than three times the size of the entire taxi industry in the 
city.44 By changing the nature of the marketplace, on-demand services 
                                                                                                                     
37. See Here’s What a 2017 Uber IPO Could Look Like, MAHESH VC (Nov. 14, 2016), 
http://www.mahesh-vc.com/blog/heres-what-a-2017-uber-ipo-could-look-like. As a private 
company, Uber does not report detailed financial information. Id. These numbers are based on 
selective information the company has disclosed in the past, plus leaked investor presentation 
materials. Id. 
38. See Sara Ashley O’Brien, “Crazy Money”—Airbnb Valued at over $25 Billion,
CNNMONEY (June 27, 2015, 6:59 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2015/06/27/technology/airbnb-
funding-valuation-update/.
39. See Julie Weed, Airbnb Grows to a Million Rooms, and Hotel Rivals Are Quiet, for 
Now, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/12/business/airbnb-grows-
to-a-million-rooms-and-hotel-rivals-are-quiet-for-now.html.
40. Just as labeling on-demand services as sharing is a misnomer, the common designation 
of Uber and Lyft as “ridesharing” is less accurate than “ride-hailing.” See Caitlin Huston, Drivers 
with Uber, Lyft and Rival Ride-Hailing Services Are Mostly 51 or Older, MARKETWATCH (Jan. 
19, 2017, 7:20 AM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/study-most-ride-hailing-drivers-are-51-
or-older-2017-01-18.
41. See Benjamin Snyder, This Ride-Sharing App Is Crushing Uber in China, FORTUNE
(June 26, 2015, 2:39 PM), http://fortune.com/2015/06/26/china-uber-didi-kuaidi/; Brian 
Solomon, Lyft: We’re Closing in on Uber with a ‘Path to Profitability,’ FORBES (May 12, 2016, 
10:00 AM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/briansolomon/2016/05/12/lyft-were-closing-in-on-
uber-with-path-to-profitability/#b90513e464ec.
42. See Collaborative Economy Honeycomb 2—Watch It Grow, CROWD COMPANIES,
http://crowdcompanies.com/blog/collaborative-economy-honeycomb-2-watch-it-grow/ (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2017).
43. Id. 
44. See Henry Blodget, Uber CEO Reveals Mind-Boggling New Statistic That Skeptics Will 
Hate, BUS. INSIDER (Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.businessinsider.com/uber-revenue-san-francisco-
2015-1.
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create new demand. And the impacts are not limited to the customer side. 
Millions of people around the world are becoming providers through 
these platforms, experiencing a new form of on-demand work. A 
February 2016 survey in the United Kingdom found that twenty-one
percent of respondents (projecting to nine million people in the United 
Kingdom) had looked for work through on-demand platforms in the past 
year.45
To understand the impact that on-demand services can have on 
business and public policy, it is important to view these services as a 
subset of a larger trend, which sweeps in other kinds of companies as 
well. Uber’s enormous valuation, for example, reflected investors’ belief 
that it would leverage its data and software-controlled network of cars to 
monetize services other than ride-hailing, which it is attempting through
local delivery.46 Similarly, IoT companies such as Google subsidiary 
Nest, which makes connected thermostats and smoke detectors,47 and 
Fitbit, which makes connected exercise monitoring bracelets,48 are most 
significant because of the potential applications of the data they collect 
and their ability to direct actions in the physical world. 
When a refrigerator can re-order groceries falling into short supply, or 
a GPS route planner can avoid congested areas while directing a driver 
across town, the lines between sharing, on-demand, data analytics, and 
connected devices blur. At some level, virtually any resource that can be 
disaggregated or modularized is a candidate for on-demand sharing, and 
                                                                                                                     
45. See URSULA HUWS & SIMON JOYCE, UNIV. OF HERTFORDSHIRE, CROWD WORKING 
SURVEY: SIZE OF THE UK’S “GIG ECONOMY” REVEALED FOR THE FIRST TIME 1 (2016), 
http://www.feps-europe.eu/assets/a82bcd12-fb97-43a6-9346-24242695a183/crowd-working-
surveypdf.pdf. 
Using a different methodology, a study released in March 2016 by J.P. Morgan Chase 
concluded that 4.2% of American adults had earned income from the “online platform economy” 
over a three-year period. JPMORGAN CHASE & CO. INST., PAYCHECKS, PAYDAYS, AND THE ONLINE 
PLATFORM ECONOMY 8 (2016), https://www.jpmorganchase.com/corporate/institute/document/
jpmc-institute-volatility-2-report.pdf. While this is significantly smaller than the UK estimate, it 
still represents approximately 10 million people. Id. And the J.P. Morgan Chase study found the 
number of participants in the online platform economy increased tenfold from the beginning of 
the period in 2012 to its end in 2015. Id. 
46. See Maya Kosoff, Here’s the Only Way Uber Can Justify Its $41 Billion Valuation,
BUS. INSIDER (July 11, 2015, 8:02 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/the-only-way-uber-can-
justify-a-41-billion-valuation-is-delivery-and-logistics-2015-7 (“The only way Uber can prove a 
valuation as massive as $40 or $50 billion is by expanding into delivery and logistics, allowing 
its fleet of drivers to move goods in addition to people.”). There is no guarantee Uber will succeed. 
Even if it does not, networked ride-hailing services will continue to seek ways to take advantage 
of their informational and software assets to expand their footprint.
47. See Rolfe Winkler & Daisuke Wakabayashi, Google to Buy Nest Labs for $3.2 Billion,
WALL ST. J., http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303595404579318952802236612
(last updated Jan. 13, 2014, 6:46 PM).
48. FITBIT, http://www.fitbit.com (last visited Mar. 15, 2017).
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virtually any physical asset is a candidate to function as both sensor and 
actuator for cloud-based software-driven systems.49
Services such as Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb are on the leading edge of 
something much bigger. They took root first and represent important 
developments in their own right. This Article highlights how they have 
already kindled significant legal and regulatory controversies. However, 
just as Amazon was far more than a disruptive entrant in the bookstore 
market, today’s on-demand services offer only a taste of what is to come. 
B.  The Next Wave for Business . . . and for Law
The confluence of On-Demand, Internet of Things, and Big Data is 
producing shockwaves that will ripple through the global economy, in the 
same way that electronic commerce, digital content, social networks, and 
online services did in prior stages of internet development. Today, even 
though only a small minority of retail commerce and advertising occurs
online in the United States,50 few would disagree those sectors have been 
radically destabilized and reconstructed. As with earlier transformations, 
the Internet of the World will unfold over many years, but its scope and 
significance are difficult to overestimate.
Yet for all the great potential of these developments, there is a catch. 
New services that restructure relationships among buyers and sellers, 
workers and managers, or consumers and producers tend to raise 
significant legal and regulatory concerns. When business models fail to 
line up with the animating assumptions of the law, confusion and 
opposition inevitably result. Sometimes the opposition comes from 
industries challenged by the new upstarts, who they argue are competing 
unfairly by ignoring settled legal obligations. Sometimes, it comes from 
governmental actors or advocates worried about erosion of legal 
protections or tax revenues. To name just some of the issues, 
controversies have arisen about the legality of on-demand services under 
                                                                                                                     
49. Of course, that extreme endpoint will not ever be reached, both because of technical 
and cost limitations, and because of human resistance to excessive automation and control. And
the diffusion process, as with any major technological shift, will be bumpy and in some areas 
slower than anticipated.
50. According to the U.S. Census Bureau, e-commerce sales represented 6.8% of total retail 
sales in the third quarter of 2015. U.S. CENSUS BUREAU NEWS, QUARTERLY RETAIL E-COMMERCE 
SALES: 4TH QUARTER 2016, at 2 (2016), https://www.census.gov/retail/mrts/www/data/pdf/
ec_current.pdf. Digital advertising represented 28% of the U.S. total in 2014. See Kenneth 
Olmstead & Kristine Lu, Digital News–Revenues Fact Sheet, in STATE OF THE NEWS MEDIA 2015,
at 17, 18 (2015), http://www. journalism.org/2015/04/29/digital-news-revenue-fact-sheet/.
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local and state laws,51 responsibility for taxes and fees,52 data privacy,53
consumer protection requirements,54 compliance with the Americans 
with Disabilities Act,55 anti-competitive practices,56 discrimination,57 and 
the legal status of workers.58
Such conflicts are inevitable with significant technology-fueled 
market transformations. There will always be winners and losers. And the
new providers run differently than those operating when the existing legal 
or regulatory arrangements were drawn up. The stakes in these situations 
are high, and not just in terms of allocating economic rents. Significant 
and hard-won protections for workers’ rights, consumers, competition, 
and other important values may be undermined. On the other side, the
potential multiplier effects downstream may stifle innovation.
As predictable questions came to the fore, many on-demand startups 
and their cheerleaders reacted by opposing any government 
involvement.59 When Hillary Clinton, during her 2016 presidential 
campaign, stated that the On-Demand Economy is “creating exciting 
economies and unleashing innovation” but “also raising hard questions 
about work-place protections and what a good job will look like in the 
                                                                                                                     
51. See, e.g., Douglas MacMillan, Uber Laws: A Primer on Ridesharing Regulations,
WALL ST. J. (Jan. 29, 2015, 10:37 PM), http://blogs.wsj.com/digits/2015/01/29/uber-laws-a-
primer-on-ridesharing-regulations.
52. See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 3, at 35; Shu-Yi Oei & Diane M. Ring, Can Sharing 
Be Taxed?, 93 WASH. U. L. REV. 989, 1026 (2016).
53. See Peppet, supra note 22, at 143–44.
54. See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 3, at 35; Katz, supra note 3, at 1113.
55. See Nina Strochlic, Uber: Disability Laws Don’t Apply to Us: Is Uber Letting Its 
Drivers Dodge The Americans With Disabilities Act?, DAILY BEAST (May 21, 2015, 5:15 AM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/05/21/uber-disability-laws-don-t-apply-to-us.html.
56. See Katz, supra note 3, at 1091–92; Erica Fink, Uber’s Dirty Tricks Quantified: Rival 
Counts 5,560 Canceled Rides, CNNMONEY (Aug. 12, 2014, 3:11 PM), 
http://money.cnn.com/2014/08/11/technology/uber-fake-ride-requests-lyft/.
57. See Benjamin Edelman et al., Racial Discrimination in the Sharing Economy: Evidence 
from a Field Experiment 2 (Harv. Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-069, 2016), 
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2701902.
58. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1148 (N.D. Cal. 2015); Katz, 
supra note 3, at 1104.
59. See, e.g., CHRISTOPHER KOOPMAN ET AL., THE SHARING ECONOMY AND CONSUMER 
PROTECTION REGULATION 5 (2014); Adam D. Thierer, The Internet of Things and Wearable 
Technology: Addressing Privacy and Security Concerns Without Derailing Innovation, RICH. 21
J.L. & TECH. 6 1 (2015) (urging “policymakers to allow [IoT] technologies to develop in a 
relatively unabated fashion”); Arun Sundararajan, Trusting the ‘Sharing Economy’ to Regulate 
Itself, N.Y TIMES (Mar. 3, 2014, 12:01 AM), https://economix.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/03/
03/trusting-the-sharing-economy-to-regulate-itself/?_r=0.
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future,”60 she was pilloried for standing in the way of innovation to please 
retrograde constituencies.61 Yet a closer examination shows that these
“hard questions” need to be considered, and in some cases, addressed 
through government action. And the startup community itself is 
beginning to acknowledge that the process of engaging with government 
is more than an unfortunate necessity;62 it can be the surest means to 
preserve and extend opportunities for innovation and further growth. 
This pattern should not be surprising. It was exactly what happened 
the first time internet-based platforms began to transform industries and 
create huge new markets. Twenty years ago, a wave of startups such as 
Netscape, eBay, Yahoo!, and Amazon burst onto the scene with 
hyperbolic growth rates and dramatic impacts on established industries. 
Legal and regulatory controversies were not far behind.
II. “IT WAS TWENTY YEARS AGO TODAY . . .” LESSONS FROM THE
DOT-COM ERA
The legal tensions of the Internet of the World are not new. The 
previous waves of internet development did not go nearly so far in 
blurring the lines between online and offline activity because they were 
anchored in personal computers and smartphones. Yet despite those 
limitations, the innovations of internet-based online services, electronic 
commerce, and digital content distribution, beginning in the mid-1990s, 
represented a connection between the virtual and physical worlds at a 
scale never before seen. The resulting confusion gave birth to an array of 
legal and regulatory conflicts, centered fundamentally on the relationship 
of physical-world governments and the emergent realm of cyberspace. 
The tensions between traditional regulatory obligations and technological 
innovations seemed intractable—until they weren’t.
The internet that computer scientists developed in the 1970s and 
1980s was for research and government uses, not commerce and 
consumer applications.63 And then, suddenly, everything changed. In 
1993, the National Center for Supercomputing Applications released 
                                                                                                                     
60. Arun Sundararajan, The ‘Gig Economy’ Is Coming. What Will It Mean for Work?,
GUARDIAN (July 25, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2015/jul/26/will-we-
get-by-gig-economy.
61. David McCabe & Tim Devaney, Hillary Clinton’s Uber Problem, HILL (July 24, 2015,
6:01 AM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/248999-hillary-clintons-uber-problem; 
William McGurn, Uber Crashes the Democratic Party, WALL ST. J. (July 20, 2015, 7:48 PM), 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-crashes-the-democratic-party-1437436110.
62. See, e.g., Arika L. Pierce, The Startup’s Guide to Government Relations, STARTUP 
GRIND, https://www.startupgrind.com/blog/the-startups-guide-to-government-relations-1/ (last 
visited Mar. 15, 2017). 
63. The Invention of the Internet, HISTORY.COM, http://www.history.com/topics/inventions/
invention-of-the-internet (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
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software engineer Marc Andreessen’s Mosaic, the first graphical web 
browser.64 Shortly thereafter, the National Science Foundation privatized 
the internet backbone, removing the last restrictions on commercial 
traffic.65 In 1995, Netscape went public with a spectacular first-day 
valuation of nearly $3 billion.66 The internet economy was off and 
running. 
Around the same time, academics and others puzzled over the legal 
implications of the newly opened realm of “cyberspace.” It was a heady 
period, with startups such as eBay, Amazon, and Yahoo! getting off the 
ground amid the economic boom of the roaring nineties. Not long before, 
H. Ross Perot ran for President in 1992 advocating “electronic town 
halls” as a new form of direct democracy.67 And the Clinton-Gore 
Administration that took office the following year trumpeted the potential 
of a National Information Infrastructure or “information 
superhighway.”68 Wired Magazine debuted in January 1993, declaring 
that “the Digital Revolution is whipping through our lives like a Bengali 
typhoon.”69
                                                                                                                     
64. See JAMES GILLIES & ROBERT CAILLIAU, HOW THE WEB WAS BORN 236–37 (2000).
65. See Brett Frischmann, Privatization and Commercialization of the Internet 
Infrastructure: Rethinking Market Intervention into Government and Government Intervention 
into the Market, 2 COLUM. SCI. & TECH. L. REV. 1, 19–21 (2001) (describing the privatization 
process); Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Fool Us Once Shame on You—Fool Us Twice Shame on 
Us: What We Can Learn from the Privatizations of the Internet Backbone Network and the 
Domain Name System, 79 WASH. U. L.Q. 89, 111–12 (2001) (describing the NSFNet 
privatization); Kevin Werbach, Only Connect, 22 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1233, 1256–57 (2007)
(explaining how privatization set the framework for internet interconnection). 
66. See Devon-Ritchie, Netscape, One of the First World Wide Web Browsers, Goes Public 
and Doubles in Value on Its First Day of Trade, FAMOUS DAILY,
http://www.famousdaily.com/history/netscape-goes-public.html (last visited Mar. 22, 2017).
67. Anthony Lewis, Abroad at Home; Governing by Television, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 1992),
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/07/opinion/abroad-at-home-governing-by-television.html;
Perot’s ‘Electronic Town Hall’ Woudn’t Work, N.Y. TIMES (June 21, 1992), 
http://www.nytimes.com/1992/06/21/opinion/l-perot-s-electronic-town-hall-wouldn-t-work-
592592.html. 
68. See generally NATIONAL INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE INITIATIVES: VISION AND 
POLICY DESIGN (Brian Kahin & Ernest J. Wilson eds., 1997) (referring to the Clinton 
Administration’s National Information Infrastructure initiative); Brian Kahin, The Internet and 
the National Information Infrastructure, in PUBLIC ACCESS TO THE INTERNET 3, 3–23 (Brian Kahin
& James Keller eds., 1995) (discussing the “information infrastructure”); Al Gore, Vice 
President, Information Superhighways Speech (Mar. 21, 1994), http://vlib.iue.it/history/internet/
algorespeech.html (using the term, “information superhighways”).
69. Andrew Leonard, Wired: The Book, SALON (Aug. 20, 1998, 3:00 PM), http://www. 
salon.com/1998/08/20/featureb_12/.
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In hindsight, the level of excitement and the financial valuations of 
many dot-com startups far exceeded their real impact in the 1990s.70 The 
internet was accessible only to those with personal computers, on slow 
and intermittent dial-up connections. It was almost entirely an American 
phenomenon. So many of the infrastructural components of today’s
global internet economy, from mobile smartphones to cloud computing 
platforms to social networks to open source software stacks, did not yet 
exist. Yet many of the massive success stories of today trace their roots,
either directly or by imitation of ideas hatched before their time, to that 
original Cambrian explosion of startups.
This period of technological and business innovation was also a fertile 
time for legal innovation. As the size and significance of the digital 
economy grew, legal and regulatory conflicts became increasingly acute. 
The initial thrust of the new wave of startups was toward new unregulated 
spaces. In time, though, the action shifted. Where the leading voices of 
the digital economy at first thought they could avoid government 
involvement, they began to recognize the inevitability of law and 
regulation playing a significant role. And then, many began to support 
government action as the best means to preserve openness and business 
opportunities. This shift was not universal, nor did the evolution always 
follow the same chronology. However, the pattern was unmistakable. 
A. Idealism: Government as Anachronism
The leitmotif of the time was that technology could free communities 
from traditional instruments of centralized governments. In 1994, author 
Howard Rheingold, an influential theorist of cyberspace, published The 
Virtual Community, suggesting that users could define their own rules 
and develop rich social fabrics online.71 Writer Kevin Kelly’s Out of 
Control appeared the same year, describing the potential of distributed 
social and technological systems to self-regulate in the manner of 
biological systems.72 Four influential futurists released a “Magna Carta 
for the Knowledge Age” calling for “repealing Second Wave laws” to
realize the potential of the new era.73
                                                                                                                     
70. Investors eventually agreed. The collapse of the dot-com bubble in 2000 wiped out 
trillions of dollars of stock-market value. Amir Sufi & Atif Mian, Why the Housing Bubble Tanked 
the Economy and the Tech Bubble Didn’t, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT (May 12, 2017, 6:03 AM), 
https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/why-the-housing-bubble-tanked-the-economy-and-the-tech-
bubble-didnt/.
71. HOWARD RHEINGOLD, THE VIRTUAL COMMUNITY 268 (1994).
72. See generally KEVIN KELLY, OUT OF CONTROL 100 (1994) (comparing computerized 
technologies to living things).
73. See Esther Dyson et al., Cyberspace and the American Dream: A Magna Carta for the 
Knowledge Age, 12 INFO. SOC’Y 295, 296 (1996).
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This was the period immediately following the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, when images of individuals swarming over the Berlin Wall to 
proclaim their freedom were fresh in everyone’s mind. The 
entrepreneurs, developers, and investors who flocked to Silicon Valley 
and other startup hotspots knew exactly who were the freedom fighters 
of the future and who were the doddering hulks of the past.
Thus, while some considered how territorial law might regulate online 
activity, unsurprisingly, many of the leading lights of the era thought that 
territorial law should not control. Among the first shots across the bow 
was a polemic from John Perry Barlow, former Grateful Dead lyricist and 
co-founder of the Electronic Frontier Foundation (EFF), a public interest 
group promoting digital rights. Barlow’s “Declaration of the 
Independence of Cyberspace” inveighed against the notion that territorial 
sovereigns had any rights to govern cyberspace.74 It was grandiloquent 
and short on substance, but it struck a nerve. Over the remainder of the 
1990s, several legal academics made common cause with Barlow, 
developing various concepts of online self-governance.75
The dot-com bubble was inflating at the same time as these legal 
developments. Netscape’s Initial Public Offering (IPO) opened the 
floodgates to a series of startups whose massive market capitalizations 
seemed out of step with their tiny revenues and non-existent profits.76 The 
more the naysayers dismissed the “New Economy,”77 the bigger the 
valuation numbers grew, in many cases surpassing iconic brick-and-
mortar brands.78 As one example, Priceline, which at the time of its initial 
public offering reported $35 million in annual revenue and a net loss of 
$114 million, was worth more than United, Continental, and Northwest 
Airlines combined.79 If the old ways of building and valuing companies 
were being left behind, why not the old ways of regulating them?
                                                                                                                     
74. John Perry Barlow, A Declaration of the Independence of Cyberspace, ELEC. FRONTIER 
FOUND. (Feb. 8, 1996), https://www.eff.org/cyberspace-independence.
75. See, e.g., I. Trotter Hardy, The Proper Legal Regime for “Cyberspace,” 55 U. PITT. L.
REV. 993, 1004 (1994); David R. Johnson & David G. Post, Law and Borders: The Rise of Law 
in Cyberspace, 48 STAN. L. REV. 1367, 1388 (1996); David G. Post, Governing Cyberspace, 43 
WAYNE L. REV. 155, 166–67 (1996); Joel R. Reidenberg, Governing Networks and Rule-Making 
in Cyberspace, 45 EMORY L.J. 911, 919 (1996).
76. See Devon-Ritchie, supra note 66; John Shinal, Netscape: The IPO That Launched an 
Era, MARKETWATCH (Aug. 5, 2005, 6:05 PM), http://www.marketwatch.com/story/netscape-ipo-
ignited-the-boom-taught-some-hard-lessons-20058518550. 
77. KEVIN KELLY, NEW RULES FOR THE NEW ECONOMY 1 (1998).
78. Id. at 98–99. At least until the bubble popped in 2000.
79. See Saul Hansell, Business Travel; Priceline.com Stock Zooms in Offering, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 31, 1999), http://www.nytimes.com/1999/03/31/business/business-travel-pricelinecom-
stock-zooms-in-offering.html.
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The “cyberlibertarians” made two kinds of arguments: descriptive and 
normative. They claimed that government could not feasibly regulate 
online services could not because the internet did not recognize national 
or other political boundaries.80 Its technical architecture moved packets 
dynamically from router to router, often using different paths for portions 
of the same connection, with no regard to the physical location of any 
waypoint along the journey. In fact, the internet was engineered to do so. 
In the words of technologist John Gilmore, “The [internet] treats 
censorship as damage and routes around it.”81 Unlike other 
communications and media networks, it had no central management 
point. Governments might issue an order against a website or an Internet 
service provider, but if that entity was not physically located within their 
borders, they could neither enforce the decree nor stop the flow of 
packets.82
The other dimension of the argument was that even if states and 
private litigants could bring online activity to heel, they should not.
Cyberspace had a right to be left alone, to govern itself.83 It was not just 
technologists and radical scholars who sang this tune. The White House 
under President Bill Clinton issued a white paper in 1997 titled, “A
Framework for Global Electronic Commerce,” which expressed as its 
first principle that “the private sector should lead” in the development of 
online commercial activity.84 While not actually endorsing the 
cyberlibertarian program (it was, after all, a policy report issued by the 
U.S. government), the Framework cemented the rhetorical preeminence 
of the “hands-off” regulatory approach in this period. 
At first, it seemed as though such idealistic approaches would carry 
the day. The opening battle in the legal wars over cyberspace regulation 
was a rout for the anti-regulatory upstarts. Concerned about a potential 
flood of digital pornography, Congress incorporated the Communications 
Decency Act (CDA)85 into a massive 1996 overhaul of U.S. 
communications laws, prohibiting indecent or obscene speech online.86
                                                                                                                     
80. See Johnson & Post, supra note 75, at 1368.
81. RICHARD ROGERS, THE INTERNET TREATS CENSORSHIP AS A MALFUNCTION AND ROUTES 
AROUND IT?: A NEW MEDIA APPROACH TO THE STUDY OF STATE INTERNET CENSORSHIP 243 
(2009), 
http://www.govcom.org/publications/full_list/Rogers_in_Parikka_Spam_book_optimized.pdf.
82. See Johnson & Post, supra note 75, at 1371–72.
83. Id. at 1402.
84. THE WHITE HOUSE, A FRAMEWORK FOR GLOBAL ELECTRONIC COMMERCE 4 (1997). The 
Author was part of the team that developed the Framework while serving as Counsel for New 
Technology Policy at the Federal Communications Commission.
85. Pub. L. No. 104-104, tit. V, 110 Stat. 56, 133–43 (codified in scattered sections of 18 
and 47 U.S.C.).
86. 47 U.S.C. § 223 (2012).
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Cyberlibertarians were outraged. The Federal Communications 
Commission (FCC) regulates indecent content on broadcast media such 
as television and radio, but the internet, cyberlibertarians argued, is 
different. Online activists and companies, including the largest web-
based services of the day, turned their web pages black in protest.87
Groups such as the EFF mobilized against the law, which they believed 
would chill online speech and business innovation.88 Barlow’s
“Declaration” was in fact penned in direct response to the CDA’s passage
as part of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.89
In Reno v. ACLU,90 decided in 1997, the Supreme Court upheld a 
lower court ruling and invalidated the CDA on First Amendment 
grounds.91 The vote was unanimous. The outcome seemed to presage an 
era in which online communities might, as legal scholars David Post and 
David Johnson promoted in an influential Stanford Law Review article, 
develop their own rules outside of those tied to territorial borders.92 Those 
who wanted a family-friendly environment could choose digital 
communities with more restrictive content policies; governments should
not be deciding the character of cyberspace as a whole.93 To the 
cyberlibertarians, Reno warned of what would happen when territorial 
states tried to meddle in non-territorial cyberspace.
B.  Realism: Government as Bully
The cyberlibertarian perspective soon provoked a contrary view from 
self-styled “cyber-realists.”94 They claimed that even if the online world 
                                                                                                                     
87. See Anthony Collings, Home Pages to Go Black in Protest, CNN (Feb. 7, 1996),
http://www.cnn.com/TECH/9602/cyber_censors/index.html; Peter H. Lewis, Protest, 
Cyberspace-Style, for New Law, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 8, 1996), http://www.nytimes.com/1996/
02/08/us/protest-cyberspace-style-for-new-law.html. A similar protest more than a decade later 
was influential in defeating the proposed Stop Online Piracy Act and Protect IP Act (SOPA-PIPA) 
in Congress. See Hayley Tsukayama & Sarah Halzack, Web Sites Go Dark in SOPA 
Protest Against Plans to Ban Online Piracy, WASH. POST (Jan. 18, 2012), 
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/web-sites-go-dark-in-sopa-protest-
against-plans-to-ban-online-piracy/2012/01/18/gIQAmWfD8P_story.html?utm_term=.2
f179de48f41.
88. Parker Higgins, The Web’s First Blackout Protest: The CDA, 20 Years Later, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND. (Feb. 23, 2016), https://www.eff.org/deeplinks/2016/02/webs-first-blackout-
protest-cda-20-years-later.
89. See Barlow, supra note 74.
90. 521 U.S. 844 (1997).
91. Id. at 885.
92. See Johnson & Post, supra note 75, at 1367.
93. Johanna M. Roodenburg,“Son of CDA”: The Constitutionality of the Child Online 
Protection Act of 1998, 6 COMM. L & POL’Y 227, 256–57 (1998).
94. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 6, at 208 (proposing that regulators develop a “sound 
law of intellectual property,” and then apply it to cyberspace); Jack L. Goldsmith, Against 
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created different contexts for legal disputes, and debates over 
extraterritorial extension of state power, the fundamental issues involved 
were not new, nor were the solutions.95 The cyber-realists found the 
cyberlibertarian dream of disregarding or sweeping away traditional legal 
structures hopelessly naïve.96 They predicted that whatever rhetorical 
victories the cyberlibertarians might achieve, established governments 
and legal systems would assert themselves when needed to govern online 
activity.97 To the realists, power is what matters. And governments, 
sometimes prodded by interest groups, are still the ones who wield it.
While the cyberlibertarians celebrated the dawning of a new era of 
freedom and innovation, others worried. Established companies and
legislators saw danger in the rise of certain online services, especially 
those challenging media and content industries.98 The CDA was an early 
example, but not the only one. In fact, John Perry Barlow and technology 
entrepreneur Mitch Kapor created the EFF to defend digital rights in 
1990, even before the commercial internet took off, in response to 
intrusive law enforcement actions against software providers and private 
online services.99 The cyberlibertarian view that cyberspace heralded the 
withering away of state power was disproven even before it became 
prominent.
The cyber-realists, for the most part, did not attack the digital 
economy. They recognized that it could create new opportunities for both 
business and free expression. Instead, they criticized the view that the 
growth of cyberspace implied an escape from historical legal and 
governance mechanisms.100 The Reno decision overturned a bad law; it 
did not suggest anything about other laws without the same constitutional 
infirmities. And the border-crossing dimension of digital activity was no 
more challenging than garden-variety international commercial 
transactions, which spawned pragmatic legal innovations such as 
                                                                                                                     
Cyberanarchy, 65 U. CHI. L. REV. 1199, 1244 (1998) (arguing that “national and international 
regulations of cyberspace transactions are legitimate and feasible”).
95. Goldsmith, supra note 94, at 1201.
96. EVGENY MOROZOV, THE NET DELUSION 318 (2011).
97. See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Cyberspace Self-Governance: A Skeptical View from 
Liberal Democratic Theory, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 395, 452 (2000) (exploring various areas where 
state intervention in cyberspace may be warranted).
98. LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS 130 (2001).
99. See A History of Protecting Freedom Where Law and Technology Collide, ELEC.
FRONTIER FOUND., https://www.eff.org/about/history (last visited Mar. 27, 2017); see also 
Mitchell Kapor, Civil Liberties in Cyberspace, 265 SCI. AM. 158, 158 (1991).
100. See generally Netanel, supra note 97 (discussing governmental involvement in 
cyberspace regulation).
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international arbitration.101 Activity online, the realists asserted, could be 
regulated, should be, and would be. 
Within a decade, the evidence was clear: the cyber-realists were 
vindicated. In case after case, state actors and private litigants pierced the 
veil of cyberspace.102 And as internet start-ups went public and grew into 
large global businesses, with tens of thousands of employees and vast 
physical and financial assets, it became both harder and less common for 
them to insist on fundamental differentiation from other companies.103
In a seminal example, Yahoo! bowed to demands from a French court 
that it remove Nazi memorabilia from its online auction site, even though 
the servers involved were in the United States, where the transaction was 
clearly protected under the First Amendment.104 If governments cared 
enough about enforcement, they were often able to get their way, 
especially as major internet companies increasingly did business—and 
therefore had business reasons to respond—in many countries around the 
world.105 Predictions that governments could not ever control their 
citizens’ online speech were belied when China implemented an effective 
network of filters across all of the links connecting its internal internet 
traffic with the rest of the world.106 These efforts to reintroduce political 
borders to the internet are imperfect but enough to refute the 
cyberlibertarian contention that states are impotent to restrict online 
activity beyond their borders.107
Perhaps the most influential case illustrating the law’s power to tame
cyberspace was the fate of Napster, the pioneering music-sharing service. 
Few companies garnered so much interest and excitement so fast, and few 
were extinguished so quickly by legal action.108 Napster’s blaze of glory 
                                                                                                                     
101. See Goldsmith, supra note 94, at 1246.
102. See JACK GOLDSMITH & TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET? ILLUSIONS OF A 
BORDERLESS WORLD 180–81 (2006).
103. Id. at 5–8.
104. See Michael Geist, Is There a There There? Toward Greater Certainty for Internet 
Jurisdiction, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1345, 1349 (2001) (noting that “[f]ew cyberlaw cases have 
attracted as much attention as the Yahoo! France” decision).
105. See Jack Goldsmith & Timothy Wu, Digital Borders: National Boundaries Have 
Survived in the Virtual World—and Allowed National Laws to Exert Control over the 
Internet, LEGAL AFF. (Jan./Feb. 2006), http://www.legalaffairs.org/issues/January-February-
2006/feature_goldsmith_janfeb06.msp.
106. See ACCESS CONTROLLED: THE SHAPING OF POWER, RIGHTS, AND RULE IN CYBERSPACE 
461 (Ronald J. Deibert et al. eds., 2010); Goldsmith & Wu, supra note 105.
107. See James Fallows, “The Connection Has Been Reset,” ATLANTIC (Mar. 2008),
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2008/03/andldquothe-connection-has-been-
resetandrdquo/6650/.
108. The Napster brand was sold and reconstituted for a licensed music service after the P2P 
system was shut down. However, it never regained a fraction of its prior scale. Michael Gowan, 
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ended ignominiously, as the courts declared its business model of 
enabling direct sharing of copyrighted content to involve contributory 
copyright infringement.109 Even though Napster had influential 
champions in the legal academy110 as well as financial support from 
powerful venture capitalists and Bertelsmann (one of the major record 
labels),111 it could not operate without the sanction of the legal system. 
Today, the late-1990s clarion calls for a cyberspace that governed 
itself, beyond the reach of “weary giants of flesh and steel,”112 are taught 
mostly as historical curiosities. The internet boom is seen as a story of 
wealth creation and innovation within the real economy, not an 
alternative to it. The watchword of post-2000 startups is “disruption,”
implying the new will take the place of the old, not merely offer a
different path.113 In this rhetorical framing, the failure of the self-styled 
New Economy lay in its refusal to engage the Old Economy, based on a 
vain belief that it could simply ignore the past.114 Yet this account misses 
a critical element. Amid the conflicts between cyberlibertarians and 
cyber-realists emerged a third thread, which affirmatively sought out 
government involvement in shaping the future of cyberspace.
C.  Post-Realism: Government as Solution
The cyber-realists rejected the notion of a self-governing digital 
sphere, but that did not mean government had any special role in online 
activity. From their perspective, cyberspace was not special: it was no 
more inherently open, innovative, or creative than other environments.115
It was only of interest to regulators where there were spillover effects in 
the physical world, as when defamatory speech in an online forum caused 
injury to real people.
                                                                                                                     
Requiem for Napster, PC WORLD (May 18, 2002, 12:17 PM), http://www.pcworld.idg.com.
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109. See A & M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1029 (9th Cir. 2001) (finding 
Napster file-sharing service guilty of contributory copyright infringement).
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http://www.cnet.com/news/record-labels-sue-napster-investor.
112. Barlow, supra note 74.
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or industry as bad. See Jill Lepore, The Disruption Machine, NEW YORKER (June 23, 2014), 
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114. See Lepore, supra note 113.
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Those who saw something valuable and unique in the new online 
environment originally viewed government as the greatest threat to its 
vitality. Soon, however, dangers appeared from other quarters. In these 
situations, government authorities were the best hope for preserving the 
dynamism of cyberspace, against threats from private actors or other 
governments.116 The realists were right: sovereign power still mattered. 
Yet they were wrong in thinking its only application was in the physical 
world. The turn to government as a facilitator and guarantor of digital 
dynamism is the most underappreciated aspect of the dot-com era.117
Historical examples in which significant segments of the internet 
community welcomed government action included the Microsoft 
antitrust case, the Internet Tax Freedom Act, and network neutrality. 
They all date to around 1998, a few years after the first flood of internet 
enthusiasm among analysts and markets but still early in the trajectory of 
the digital economy. 
1. Microsoft 
The first great turn toward government as a solution was the 
Department of Justice’s antitrust case against Microsoft. At the dawn of 
the internet era, Microsoft cast a long shadow over the nascent online 
environment. It dominated the personal computer industry, with its 
Windows operating system enjoying over 90 percent market share and its 
Office application software not much behind.118 Virtually all personal 
devices accessing the internet ran Windows (Apple was then a non-factor 
and smartphones did not yet exist), and Microsoft’s Internet Explorer 
browser quickly became the dominant application for accessing the 
World Wide Web.119
In 1998, the U.S. government sued the software company, claiming 
that it was illegally tying other products to its dominant Windows 
operating system.120 The trial court agreed, and the Justice Department 
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7, 22 (2001). 
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pressed for a breakup of the company into application and operating 
system providers.121 Government intervention in Microsoft’s business 
practices, especially the claims based on Microsoft’s actions toward 
online services, represented a huge move to shape the trajectory of the 
internet market.
Many companies saw the Department of Justice intervention as 
essential to competitive opportunities on the digital frontier. In particular, 
Netscape, then the most prominent startup of the World Wide Web era, 
actively promoted and assisted the investigation.122 Its outside lawyer, 
Gary Reback, became the face of anti-Microsoft advocacy, organizing a 
coalition of technology companies to argue in favor of antitrust action.123
The companies believed that an unchecked Microsoft would use its power 
to prevent the internet from emerging as a truly open environment for 
innovation.124
Thus, the arguments for action against Microsoft paralleled the 
arguments against government regulation of indecent online speech or 
P2P file-sharing technology: preserve the internet as a space where any 
company could succeed and any individual could express herself. There 
were clear analogies between the Microsoft case and the U.S. 
government’s last great antitrust crusade in network industries, the 
breakup of the AT&T telephone monopoly.125
Support for the government’s case against Microsoft was far from 
universal among internet companies. Many feared that once government 
could shape competitive arrangements in the software industry, it would 
not stop with Microsoft. The level of endorsement, however, showed that 
the story of cyberlaw was not as simple as it first seemed. The proponents
of an open and unconstrained internet environment might achieve their 
goals through the means of government action, rather than limits on it. 
                                                                                                                     
note 119, at 10.
121. Microsoft, 87 F. Supp. 2d at 56. 
122. See William H. Page & Seldon J. Childers, Software Development as an Antitrust 
Remedy: Lessons from the Enforcement of the Microsoft Communications Protocol Licensing 
Requirement, 14 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 77, 94 (2007) (explaining how a Netscape 
white paper played a key role in prodding the Department of Justice to act).
123. Reback later wrote a book expanding on this thesis. See generally GARY L. REBACK,
FREE THE MARKET! (2009) (arguing for government intervention in the free market). More 
recently, he has pushed for antitrust action against Microsoft’s current nemesis, Google. See 
James Temple, Antitrust Bulldog Gary Reback Pushes Google Probe, SFGATE (Jan. 24, 2011,
4:00 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/business/article/Antitrust-bulldog-Gary-Reback-pushes-
Google-probe-3161423.php.
124. See Temple, supra note 123.
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In the end, the government’s action against Microsoft was more 
influential than it might outwardly appear. President George W. Bush 
took office in 2001, and his administration quickly settled with Microsoft, 
abandoning the structural remedies the Clinton Administration had
sought.126 From that point forward, however, Microsoft was a subtly 
different company. Its patina of invincibility had been marred, and its 
culture began to rein in the kinds of practices that had earned it the 
government’s attention.127 Microsoft invested significantly in its legal 
and government affairs operations. Newer companies such as Google, 
which grew up in the aftermath of the Microsoft case, did not wait to 
make similar investments.128 They recognized that engagement with 
government was necessary, and potentially beneficial, even at relatively 
early stages of their development.129
2. The Internet Tax Freedom Act
Please forward this to everyone you can...
There is a new bill in the US Congress that will affect ALL 
INTERNET USERS. CNN stated that the Government 
would in two weeks time decide whether to allow or not 
allow a Charge to YOUR phone bill equal to a long distance 
call each time you access the internet. 
This affects us all! We cannot allow this to happen! Please 
visit the following URL and fill out the necessary form to let 
your Congressman know how you feel! The address is 
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http://www.house.gov/writerep/. Write your representative!130
Ever since the 1990s, warnings such as the one above have circulated 
about an FCC “modem tax” on computer users. The issue originated with 
a 1983 FCC decision that computer-based “enhanced services” were not
subject to interstate access charges that local telephone companies 
required long-distance carriers to pay.131 The FCC repeatedly denied its 
intent to impose a modem tax.132 Nonetheless, alarm that government 
actors might see online activity as a lucrative new source of revenue was 
instructive. 
It should not be surprising that taxation concerns were among the first 
public policy fights to arise around the internet. Taxation and fees are the 
primary means by which governments fund their operations. If certain 
categories of activity are exempt from tax obligations, it puts pressure on 
government budgets. This is especially true in the United States today, in 
an era of deficit spending, with significant political opposition to any new 
revenue generation and an increasing share of the budget devoted to non-
discretionary entitlements. Taxation can also significantly affect
competition. If the government taxes some competitors in a market and 
does not tax others, those subject to the tax may be disadvantaged 
artificially. Compounding the issue, the smaller the taxpayer base, the 
more each must pay to generate a constant level of revenue. And if in 
response to the price imbalance, customers shift to the un-taxed 
providers, the tax-base erosion accelerates.
There are tens of thousands of taxing jurisdictions in America. 
Rejection of the cyberlibertarian claim that cyberspace is nowhere 
potentially means that it is everywhere, within striking distance of all of 
them. The only surefire way to keep all those government authorities 
from sinking their claws into online activity was through government 
action in the opposite direction.
In 1998, Congress passed the Internet Tax Freedom Act (ITFA)133 for 
the first time. At a time when economic activity online was still tiny 
relative to brick-and-mortar transactions, Congress preemptively cut off 
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the ability for states and localities to raise revenues or protect incumbent 
businesses by targeting local sources of digital transactions.134 The 
arguments in favor of such a step were the same ones the cyberlibertarians
voiced: the internet was a great space of opportunity for innovation and 
creativity, which the entanglements of political actors should not weigh 
down.135 Only this time, it was politicians arguing that positive 
government action was needed to preserve the dynamic internet.
The ITFA bars only discriminatory taxes on online services.136 A tax 
or fee that applies equally to equivalent online and offline conduct is not 
forbidden. The challenge for any local or state taxing authority, however, 
is how to establish a nexus between its jurisdiction and the online actions 
being taxed.137 The most prominent example are sales taxes. If a customer 
buys a book at a Barnes & Noble bookstore in Manhattan, that transaction 
is subject to city and state sales taxes. If the customer, while standing in 
the bookstore, pulls out a smartphone and buys the identical book from 
Amazon, it is not subject to such taxes, because the transaction does not 
occur in New York.138
For some time, the conflict was between Amazon’s view that sales tax 
should never apply to its transactions and states’ argument that it always 
should. As with the broader cyberlaw debate, Amazon’s objections to 
collection of sales tax were both normative and practical. It complained 
of the unfairness of serving as a tax collector for states and localities 
where it did not operate.139 And it argued that it could not possibly keep 
track of and apply the hundreds of different tax rates in the jurisdictions 
it ships to.140
Over time, both Amazon and its opponents have been willing to 
compromise. Amazon now collects sales tax for transactions involving 
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customers in almost half of U.S. states.141 Contrary to predictions, this 
has not caused big problems for Amazon.142 An all-or-nothing battle over 
taxation of electronic commerce has thus given way to a situation in 
which much is taxed, much of the time, but the growth of e-commerce 
has proceeded apace. The affirmative step of federal legislation, with the 
support of e-commerce providers, was a significant factor in this result. 
The ITFA both avoided overlapping and excessive internet taxation when 
it would have been most damaging and created breathing room for 
negotiations.
3. Network Neutrality
The recognition of government’s potentially constructive role in the 
digital economy reached its zenith with the push for network neutrality 
rules against discrimination by broadband access providers.143 Debates 
about the power of broadband providers to foreclose innovation began in 
the late 1990s with the unsuccessful fight for open access to early cable 
broadband systems.144 Law professor Tim Wu introduced the term 
“network neutrality” in 2003, refocusing the effort from physical access 
to non-discrimination rules.145 Now it was startups and internet-focused 
academics who were advocating government action, and more 
established companies, such as the incumbent telecommunications 
                                                                                                                     
141. See Greg Bensinger, Which States Make You Pay an Amazon Sales Tax, WALL ST. J.
(Oct. 1, 2014, 1:47 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/states-that-make-amazon-pay-sales-taxes-
1412185657. 
142. Rich Smith, Amazon’s Sales Tax Move Changed Everything . . . and Nothing,
DAILYFINANCE (Apr. 29, 2014, 6:00 AM), http://www.dailyfinance.com/2014/04/29/amazons-
sales-tax-move-changed-everything-and-nothing/; see also Christina Le, The Honeymoon’s Over: 
States Crack down on the Virtual World’s Tax-Free Love Affair with E-Commerce, 7 HOUS. BUS.
& TAX L.J. 395, 408 (2007) (“Most e-businesses that exist solely in cyberspace, or are 
incorporated in only one state but sell nationwide, have taken advantage of the stringent standard 
and operated for many years without paying state sales and use taxes.”).
143. See Brett M. Frischmann & Barbara van Schewick, Network Neutrality and the 
Economics of an Information Superhighway: A Reply to Professor Yoo, 47 JURIMETRICS 383, 384–
89 (2007); Barbara van Schewick, Towards an Economic Framework for Network Neutrality 
Regulation, 5 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 329, 331–34 (2007).
144. See Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End: Preserving the 
Architecture of the Internet in the Broadband Era, 48 UCLA L. REV. 925, 929 (2001); Kevin 
Werbach, The Architecture of Internet 2.0, RELEASE 1.0, Feb. 1999, at 10. The open access debate 
began in 1998 with AT&T’s acquisition of TCI, the largest cable operator, and its broadband 
access systems. Opponents of the merger urged the imposition of open access conditions to allow 
competing internet access providers to offer broadband service through the TCI platform. See 
James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules for 
Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39, 77 (2000).
145. Tim Wu, Network Neutrality, Broadband Discrimination, 2 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH 
TECH. L. 141, 141–44 (2003); see also Werbach, supra note 65, at 1238–43 (distinguishing 
interconnection and non-discrimination approaches to network openness).
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carriers, issuing warnings about going too far in “regulating the 
internet.”146
The network neutrality movement was built on the premise that online 
services were inherently dependent on other private actors, most notably 
the operators of the physical networks used to access and transport data 
on the internet.147 If a broadband access provider discriminated against 
unaffiliated content providers or exacted a high access fee to reach its 
customers, allowing online providers to define their own rules was not a
solution. One of the reasons the cyberlibertarian vision of the unregulated 
internet worked was that the participants had traditionally adhered to a 
set of norms that prevented classic economic hold-up behaviors.148
Adherence to these norms was partly cultural and partly reflected the 
competitive dynamics in the early Internet.149
By the mid-2000s, both of those factors changed. Broadband access 
providers were descended from telecommunications companies, not 
internet startups, so their business values did not necessarily reflect those 
of the network engineering community that gave birth to the internet.150
And for both the online services and access provider market, a few 
companies became so dominant that they could make demands that others 
felt compelled to accept.151 In such an environment, government action 
was seen as the only way to alter the behavior of these players.152
Entrepreneurial technology startups weighed in aggressively in the 
debate, primarily in favor of stronger rules placing greater limits on the 
broadband providers.153
                                                                                                                     
146. The argument for network neutrality rules is not necessarily inconsistent with the earlier 
anti-regulatory spirit. Network neutrality proponents are concerned about private power limiting 
free expression and competition, not just public power. See Jasper P. Sluijs, From Competition to 
Freedom of Expression: Introducing Article 10 ECHR in the European Network Neutrality 
Debate, 12 HUM. RTS. L. REV. 509, 510 (2012). 
147. See Van Schewick, supra note 143, at 337; Wu, supra note 145, at 148–49.
148. See Phillip J. Weiser, The Future of Internet Regulation, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 529, 
534–35 (2009).
149. See id. at 534. 
150. See id. at 535.
151. See John Blevins, Death of the Revolution: The Legal War on Competitive Broadband 
Technologies, 12 YALE J.L. & TECH. 85, 92–93 (2009).
152. See id. at 93–94. 
153. See Julia Boorstin, Why Start-Ups Are Also Against the FCC’s Net Neutrality Proposal,
NBC NEWS (July 15, 2014, 2:09 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/tech/tech-news/why-start-ups-
are-also-against-fccs-net-neutrality-proposal-n156526; Gerry Smith, Tech Startups May Be the 
Last Line of Defense for Net Neutrality, HUFFINGTON POST (May 2, 2014, 12:49 PM), 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2014/05/02/net-neutrality-tech-startups_n_5247506.html.
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The network neutrality debate rages on.154 Over time, however, its 
focus has shifted. The conflict no longer centers on whether broadband 
access providers may discriminate in arbitrary ways against services and 
applications on their networks. The providers themselves now accept that 
some discriminatory practices are harmful to competition and 
innovation.155 The idea that government has a role to preserve the vitality 
and openness of the internet has become well-established, even if the 
specifics of that role remain controversial.
D. Insights from History
An outline can be distilled from this brief history of twenty years of 
cyberlaw. Debates followed a common pattern: oscillation between calls 
for self-regulation or “unregulation”156 on the one hand and clumsy 
efforts to impose excessive regulation on the other, eventually giving way 
to accommodations in which government played more of a convening, 
legitimizing, and enforcing role than a rule-setting one.
From an historical perspective, the predictions that the internet and 
electronic commerce would have dramatic economic and social effects, 
eventually becoming pervasive in much of the world, proved accurate. 
The issues legal scholars raised from the internet’s earliest commercial 
growth, such as intermediary liability and intellectual property 
protection, have proven to be significant challenges to this day. Progress 
occurred not when government sat on its hands but when legal and 
                                                                                                                     
154. See Brent Kendall, Appeals Court to Hear Arguments over FCC’s Net-Neutrality Rules,
WALL ST. J. (Aug. 3, 2015, 6:25 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/appeals-court-to-hear-
arguments-over-fccs-net-neutrality-rules-1438640757 (discussing the pending legal challenge to 
the FCC’s early 2015 decision); Rebecca R. Ruiz, F.C.C. Sets Net Neutrality Rules, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 12, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/13/technology/fcc-releases-net-neutrality-
rules.html (describing the FCC’s latest network neutrality rules, which involved reclassification 
of broadband access as a regulated telecommunications service).
155. See, e.g., David L. Cohen, Surprise! We Agree with the President’s Principles on Net 
Neutrality: Reiterating Our Strong Support for the Open Internet, COMCAST VOICES (Nov. 11, 
2014), http://corporate.comcast.com/comcast-voices/surprise-we-agree-with-the-presidents-
principles-on-net-neutrality-reiterating-our-strong-support-for-the-open-internet (claiming that 
Comcast supports network neutrality).
156. While it might be natural to refer to the position opposing government obligations on 
internet-based services as deregulatory, that would be something of a misnomer. The desire to 
avoid excessive regulation of nascent and innovative internet-based technologies was certainly
consonant with the deregulation trend that had dominated administrative law in the United States 
since the 1980s. However, because internet-based services were generally not regulated to begin 
with, it is more appropriate to use a term coined by former FCC attorney Jason Oxman, in an 
agency white paper: unregulation. See Jason Oxman, The FCC and the Unregulation of the 
Internet (FCC Office of Plans & Pol’y, Working Paper No. 31, 1999), 
http://www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working_papers/oppwp31.pdf.
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regulatory actors took the initiative to institute reforms focused on 
universal goals rather than particular historical artifacts. 
Government engagement with innovative new markets and industries 
can serve a number of positive goals.157 These include legitimizing new 
business models, facilitating competition in cases of market failure,
increasing trust in new services by setting baselines and remedies,
restraining other government actors from harmful decisions, and 
eliminating situations in which vague or overlapping obligations create 
difficulties for new entrants. Government can also take an affirmative 
stand in favor of innovation or new entrants, such as by delaying 
imposition of requirements that would otherwise apply or imposing 
limitations on established firms that might crush them. 
Each of the case studies involves a different form of government 
action. The Microsoft antitrust case involved remedial intervention to 
protect consumers and a well-functioning market. The ITFA was a 
preemptive strike against excessive claims by other government actors.
And network neutrality involved direct economic regulation. The internet 
companies that supported these actions did not give government a blank 
check to do as it pleased in cyberspace; they endorsed specific actions to 
fix specific problems. Taken as a whole, though, these developments and 
others like them showed a newfound tolerance for legal and regulatory 
solutions. 
III. THE LONG AND WINDING ROAD: LAW AND THE NEW NEW ECONOMY
The dot-com startups of the 1990s and those of today’s Internet of the 
World face similar policy challenges, playing out in a similar pattern. 
Reflexive and restrictive government action can—and has—put a damper 
on innovation, wealth creation, and new services with major consumer 
and societal benefits. On the other hand, sometimes markets left alone 
create sub-optimal results, either measured in formal economic welfare 
terms or by societal values such as innovation and equity. And sometimes 
government action must kick-start markets themselves. 
From an economic standpoint, regulation is a second-best solution to 
maximize welfare in cases of market failure, such as monopolization, 
informational asymmetries, and externalities.158 As public-choice 
theorists have pointed out, regulation is also subject to political 
economies that can lead regulators to privilege the desires of interest 
                                                                                                                     
157. See Ranchordás, supra note 4, at 30.
158. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 15–17 (1982)
(discussing the efficacy of regulation in theory); 1 ALFRED E. KAHN, THE ECONOMICS OF 
REGULATION: PRINCIPLES AND INSTITUTIONS (1971) (same).
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groups or regulated incumbents.159 Regulation optimized for legacy 
industries can stifle innovation if it blocks or unfairly disadvantages new 
entrants.160 However, regulators can just as easily design regimes that 
allow for and even promote innovation as a positive value.161
The development of the digital economy in its first decade shows how 
initial skepticism about government, and the view that government was 
an unchanging exogenous factor, gave way as situations arose in which 
government involvement was valuable or even necessary. The Microsoft 
antitrust case, the ITFA, and network neutrality were all cases in which 
significant segments of the technology industry came down on the side 
of direct government action. There is no reason to believe the pattern will 
be any different for the On-Demand Economy and the other emerging 
digital market segments today. 
None of this is to suggest that regulators are always right. 
Governmental actors are fallible, subject to political forces, and often 
stuck with imperfect policy implements. Regulators frequently make hard 
choices. For example, views differ about whether the FCC’s network 
neutrality rules are a victory or defeat for innovation.162 It is telling, 
however, that most of the startups and smaller internet-based services 
providers that weighed in actively supported stronger FCC rules.163 The 
important point is that the debate has moved from one about whether the 
FCC should take interest in discriminatory practices of broadband 
providers to how, when, and under what circumstances it should act.
The story for the new digital ecosystem is playing out very similarly 
to the past. Many legal and regulatory flashpoints are emerging.164 The 
initial debate framing is whether to regulate, with each side making dire 
predictions about consequences of the opposing outcome. Yet over time, 
it becomes clear that government action can help as much as hurt the new 
service providers in developing and solidifying their markets. Four 
                                                                                                                     
159. See BREYER, supra note 158, at 20; see also Richard Posner, Theories of Economic 
Regulation, 5 BELL J. ECON. 335, 341 (1974); George J. Stigler, The Theory of Economic 
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. 3, 4 (1971).
160. See Ranchordás, supra note 4, at 30.
161. See id. at 31; Richard S. Whitt, Adaptive Policymaking: Evolving and Applying 
Emergent Solutions for U.S. Communications Policy, 61 FED. COMM. L.J. 483, 487 (2009).
162. See Tim Wu & Christopher S. Yoo, Keeping the Internet Neutral? Tim Wu and 
Christopher Yoo Debate, 59 FED. COMM. L.J. 575, 575, 577 (2007).
163. See, e.g., Letter from Automattic et al. to the Fed. Commc’ns Comm’n (Feb. 18, 2015),
http://engine.is/wp-content/uploads/14-28-Feb-18-2015-Engine-Letter.pdf (advocating strong 
network neutrality rules on behalf of a large number of internet startups); see also Boorstin, supra
note 153 (describing startup advocacy in favor of stronger net neutrality rules); Smith, supra note 
153.
164. See generally Katz, supra note 3 (surveying a variety of legal issues for the sharing 
economy); Peppet, supra note 22, at 93–95 (discussing discrimination, privacy, security, and 
consent issues for the Internet of Things).
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examples illustrate this pattern: regulatory classification, algorithmic 
monopolies, taxation or fees, and platform responsibility.165
A. Regulatory Classification 
The first and most prominent issue concerns how to classify new 
services that do not easily fit into available legal categories. Not 
surprisingly, the initial position of on-demand and other startups is that 
they cannot and should not be subject to the old rules and therefore should 
be left to regulate themselves. Their predecessors made the same 
argument in the 1990s, when cyberlibertarianism was in full swing. 
Equally unsurprisingly, a contrary movement urges that regulators bar the 
on-demand providers from operating unless they meet the requirements 
of existing regulations. Neither option is tenable. Both government actors 
and the new entrants must take the initiative to update legal regimes. 
Despite the noisy debate, this is beginning to take place.
1. Ignoring the Rules?
Former Uber CEO Travis Kalanick, the most visible embodiment of 
the On-Demand Economy, has described himself as a “freedom fighter”
because of his efforts to overcome unnecessary regulations.166 The rapid 
growth of on-demand services without affirmative legal authorization, 
sometimes in open defiance of existing regulations, has created the 
misimpression that regulatory arbitrage is a necessary aspect of on-
demand business models.167 In this, they mirror their predecessors of the 
dot-com era.
In the early days of cyberlaw, internet-based services focused
primarily on moving digital assets (music, software, etc.) or digitizing the 
                                                                                                                     
165. These are by no means the only legal and regulatory issues for the emerging Internet of 
the World. Most of the others, though, extend from the basic questions of regulatory classification 
or the decision about relative responsibilities of the platforms and their front-line workers. Others 
are not unique to the Internet of the World. For example, Internet of Things devices can collect 
large amounts of potentially very sensitive personal data, often without users’ awareness. See 
Peppet, supra note 22, at 108–11. Uber specifically has been the subject of controversy over 
privacy practices, based on its ability to track users’ movements. See Natasha Singer & Mike 
Isaac, Uber Data Collection Changes Should Be Barred, Privacy Group Urges, N.Y. TIMES (June 
22, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/23/technology/uber-data-collection-changes-
should-be-barred-privacy-group-urges.html?_r=0. These are important questions, but in many 
ways, they are extensions of privacy and security debates about online advertising, social
networks, digital mapping, and other services stretching back to the early days of the commercial 
internet. 
166. Lydia Depillis, Uber Mensch, NEW REPUBLIC (Apr. 29, 2013), https://newrepublic.com/
article/113059/ubers-travis-kalanick-fights-startups-playing-his-own-game.
167. See Edelman & Geradin, supra note 3, at 327; Brishen Rogers, The Social Costs of 
Uber, 82 U. CHI. L. REV. DIALOGUE 85, 87 (2015).
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process of transacting around physical goods (Amazon, eBay, etc.). In a 
number of cases, entrants sought to arbitrage established legal regimes 
that governed such activities. YouTube and other video hosting platforms 
skirted intellectual property rules. Skype and other voice over internet 
protocol (VOIP) services ignored communications regulation.168 PayPal 
sought to evade banking regulation.169 Even Google, by storing the full 
text of web pages without permission, disregarded copyright protections 
to build its search index.170 None of these services would have enjoyed 
the same success had they waited for unambiguous approval of their 
business models before launching. In fact, YouTube beat out other video 
hosting platforms of the time, such as Google, partly based on its 
willingness to look the other way (or worse) on infringing material.171
Many legally questionable services from the dot-com era eventually 
succeeded in solidifying their status, either by convincing courts and 
regulators they were complying with existing rules or by convincing 
legislators and administrative agencies to revise the rules. Of course, this 
was not always the case. Napster and several other services pushing the 
limits of copyright, in particular, found themselves on the wrong side of 
court decisions, leading to their demise.172
Today, Uber’s business model of entering markets without legal 
authorization is most directly analogous to P2P startups like Napster and 
Skype.173 Of 276 cities in which Uber operated at the end of 2014, just 
                                                                                                                     
168. VOIP services were initially in a legal gray area in the United States, but many countries
clearly prohibited them at the time of introduction. See Mark C. Del Bianco, Voices Past: The 
Present and Future of VOIP Regulation, 14 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 365, 381 (2006) (“[I]n many 
countries laws provided for a monopoly on voice service by a single, often government-owned, 
entity, so VoIP service by any other entity was automatically illegal . . . .”).
169. See Mark E. Budnitz, Consumer Payment Systems: New Products and Services, New 
Law and New Problems, 56 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 52, 53 (2002) (“PayPal’s legal status is 
unclear, making legal recourse by consumers problematic. PayPal claims it is a money transmitter, 
subject to state money transmitter laws, but several states have disputed that claim. . . . If PayPal 
is not a money transmitter, then it likely is an unchartered bank, operating illegally without a 
charter.”).
170. Google’s caching and linking practices were eventually challenged under copyright law 
and found non-infringing. See, e.g., Field v. Google, Inc., 412 F. Supp. 2d 1106, 1109–10 (D. 
Nev. 2006).
171. David Kaplan, YouTube-Viacom, Part Two: YouTube Founders’ Emails Show 
Struggles over Copyrighted Works, GIGAOM (Mar. 18, 2010, 4:14 PM), https://gigaom.com/2010/
03/18/419-youtube-viacom-part-two-youtube-founders-e-mails-show-struggles-over-co
(documenting how YouTube’s founders tolerated and sometimes encouraged distribution of 
popular infringing content to grow usage of their service).
172. See supra note 108 and accompanying text.
173. See Benjamin Edelman, Whither Uber? Competitive Dynamics in Transportation
Networks, COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L, Spring/Autumn 2015, at 30, 36, https://www.competition
policyinternational.com/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/Competition-Volumen-w-cover-11-
Num-1.pdf (drawing an analogy between Uber’s market entry strategy and Napster).
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seventeen had passed ordinances expressly authorizing its business.174 In 
most major cities around the world, only licensed taxis (often subject to 
restrictions on entry through a medallion system) or licensed livery (black 
car) services can provide for-hire transportation.175 Uber, which views 
itself as a software application that matches independent drivers and 
riders, fits neither category well.176 So in most cases, it has simply begun 
operating and then pushed local regulators to recognize it.177 Other on-
demand services such as Airbnb have also set up shop and expanded 
rapidly without regulatory authorization.178
The argument in favor of this approach is that local governments move 
too slowly and are beholden to incumbent providers, so innovators must 
take matters in their own hands if they hope to succeed.179 In a typical 
example, prominent venture capitalist and essayist Paul Graham tweeted 
in 2012 that “Uber is so obviously a good thing that you can measure how 
corrupt cities are by how hard they try to suppress it.”180 Uber provides a 
convenient service to many users frustrated with taxis, so it has a ready-
made army of supporters to point to and leverage in its battles against 
                                                                                                                     
174. See Eva Grantsimran Khosla, Here’s Everywhere Uber Is Banned Around the World,
BUS. INSIDER (Apr. 8, 2015, 11:03 AM), http://www.businessinsider.com/heres-everywhere-uber-
is-banned-around-the-world-2015-4; MacMillan, supra note 51.
175. Jenny Che, 9 Countries That Aren’t Giving Uber an Inch, HUFFINGTON POST (Aug. 12, 
2015, 12:29 PM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/entry/uber-countries-governments-taxi-
drivers_us_55bfa3a9e4b0d4f33a037a4b (listing numerous cities across the world that have 
banned transportation services like Uber). 
176. In New York City, for example, Uber is in conflict with the city over issues such as 
access for riders with disabilities, contributions to traffic congestion, and collection of taxes to 
support mass transit. See Matt Flegenheimer & Emma Fitzsimmons, City Hall and Uber Clash in 
Struggle over New York Streets, N.Y. TIMES (July 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/
07/17/nyregion/city-hall-and-uber-clash-in-struggle-over-new-york-streets.html.
177. See Schumpeter, Shredding the Rules, ECONOMIST (May 2, 2015), 
http://www.economist.com/news/business/21650142-striking-number-innovative-companies-
have-business-models-flout-law-shredding; Karen Weise, This is How Uber Takes over a City,
BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (June 23, 2015, 6:06 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/
news/features/2015-06-23/this-is-how-uber-takes-over-a-city. Uber has taken the same position 
with regard to specific local obligations, such as the requirement to serve customers with 
disabilities. See Strochlic, supra note 55.
178. See Dana Palombo, A Tale of Two Cities: The Regulatory Battle to Incorporate Short-
Term Residential Rentals into Modern Law, 4 AM. U. BUS. L. REV. 287, 289–90 (2015); Press 
Release, N.Y. State Office of the Att’y Gen., A.G. Schneiderman Releases Report Documenting 
Widespread Illegality Across Airbnb’s NYC Listings; Site Dominated by Commercial Users
(Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.ag.ny.gov/press-release/ag-schneiderman-releases-report-
documenting-widespread-illegality-across-airbnbs-nyc (claiming that 72% of Airbnb listings in 
New York were illegal).
179. See Sundararajan, supra note 59.
180. Paul Graham (@paulg), TWITTER (July 9, 2012, 3:49 PM), https://twitter.com/ 
paulg/status/222462460978937856.
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local regulators.181 The counterargument is well stated by Barry 
Korengold, president of the San Francisco Cab Drivers Association, in an 
article about Uber in Vanity Fair: “I think of them as robber barons. They 
started off by operating illegally, without following any of the regulations 
and unfairly competing. And that’s how they became big—they had 
enough money to ignore all the rules.”182
One seeming contrast to the parallel dot-com era startups is that many 
of the rules governing on-demand service providers are local.183 A
decision to authorize Uber in New York or Chicago has no effect on its 
legitimacy in Portland or Philadelphia. However, this discontinuity 
parallels the long-identified conflict between territorial laws made by 
sovereign governments and online systems that are ignorant of political 
borders.184 Many real-space markets are local because of physical limits 
on service delivery, communities, or information flow. Cyberspace, 
being inherently dimensionless, tends toward offerings that are national 
or even global.185 The current generation of on-demand services further 
eliminates the boundaries between the physical and digital worlds.186
The need to engage with local regulators adds additional complexity 
to the resolution of legal issues for on-demand services, but the basic 
controversies cover similar ground. Economics and customer needs for 
local services often vary little between cities, even when a different 
regulator is empowered in each one. Therefore, the ultimate equilibrium 
for services such as Uber is likely to involve similar treatment in all major 
                                                                                                                     
181. Fitz Tepper, Uber Launches “De Blasio’s Uber” Feature in NYC with 25-Minute Wait
Times, TECHCRUNCH (July 16, 2015), http://techcrunch.com/ 2015/07/16/uber-launches-de-
blasios-uber-feature-in-nyc-with-25-minute-wait-times/; see Weise, supra note 177.
182. Kara Swisher, Man and Uber Man, VANITY FAIR (Nov. 5, 2014, 12:00 AM), 
http://www.vanityfair.com/news/2014/12/uber-travis-kalanick-controversy.
183. See GORMAN GILBERT & ROBERT E. SAMUELS, THE TAXICAB: AN URBAN 
TRANSPORTATION SURVIVOR 142–43 (1982); Hannah A. Posen, Ridesharing in the Sharing 
Economy: Should Regulators Impose Uber Regulations on Uber?, 101 IOWA L. REV. 405, 410 
(2015) (“While the federal government was largely responsible for taxi regulations during and 
after World War II, by the 1970s, regulating the taxi industry was largely left to municipalities.”).
The exact structure varies. In Pennsylvania, the Pennsylvania Public Utility Commission regulates
taxi services everywhere but Philadelphia, where the Philadelphia Parking Authority regulates 
them. See Justine Coyne, PUC Grants Emergency Approval for Lyft, Uber, PITT. BUS. TIMES (July 
24, 2014, 10:50 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/pittsburgh/news/2014/07/24/puc-grants-
emergency-approval-for-lyft-uber.html; Philadelphia Taxis & Limos, PA. PUB. UTIL.
COMMISSION, http://www.puc.state.pa.us/consumer_info/transportation/motor_carrier/
philadelphia_taxis_limos.aspx (last visited Mar. 16, 2016).
184. See Johnson & Post, supra note 75, at 1367–70; Post, supra note 75, at 170–71.
185. See Johnson & Post, supra note 75, at 1370.
186. One consequence of this merger is that digitally-enabled services in one location can 
have significant spillover effects elsewhere. Such spillovers have been analyzed in the 
environmental law context but not extensively for online activity. See Sarah Light, Precautionary 
Federalism and the Sharing Economy, 66 EMORY L.J. 333, 353 (2017).
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cities. The existing local regulation just makes the process of resolving 
the issues longer. 
Backed by billions of dollars in funding, Uber has waged an 
aggressive campaign against localities refusing to authorize its 
business.187 Local authorities in cities such as Philadelphia have 
responded by fining or even impounding cars of Uber drivers.188 In 
Brisbane, Australia, Uber reportedly blocked the accounts of transport 
inspectors to prevent them from imposing fines for its unlicensed 
operation.189 It has won some significant victories, including in New 
York City, where the mayor sought to cap the number of Uber vehicles 
and impose other conditions.190 Yet in some locales, such as Germany, 
Uber has been forced to retreat under pressure from regulators.191
2. Finding Shared Interests
In predicting the path forward for Uber and other unauthorized on-
demand services, the useful comparison is between the failure of Napster 
and Grokster, on the one hand, and the success of Skype’s VOIP service, 
on the other. The P2P file-sharing services claimed that technology put 
them outside the reach of traditional legal rules, but the Supreme Court 
rejected their arguments.192 While these companies gained support from 
copyright reform advocates and other forces, they could not call upon 
significant government actors to advocate for their cause. 
Skype, by contrast, took advantage of the FCC’s unwillingness to 
classify VOIP as a telecommunications service, based on its desire to 
                                                                                                                     
187. See Weise, supra note 177. Airbnb has been similarly aggressive, mobilizing its users 
as a political force and spending millions to defeat a proposed San Francisco ordinance that would 
have greatly restricted its operations. See Conor Dougherty & Mike Isaac, Airbnb and Uber 
Mobilize Vast User Base to Sway Policy, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2015), 
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Them, SFGATE (Jan. 11, 2015, 10:18 AM), http://www.sfgate.com/ business/article/Uber-Lyft-
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PHILA. MAG. (Oct. 26, 2014, 1:17 PM), http://www.phillymag.com/news/ 2014/10/26/uber-
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ENGADGET (Jan. 15, 2015), http://www.engadget.com/2015/01/15/uber-dodges-fines-australia/.
190. Josh Dawsey & Andrew Tangel, Uber Won’t Face Limits on Surge Pricing Under NYC 
Council Legislation, WALL ST. J. (Jan. 15, 2016, 6:37 PM), http://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-
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191. See Mark Scott, Uber’s No-Holds-Barred Expansion Strategy Fizzles in Germany, N.Y.
TIMES (Jan. 3, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/04/technology/ubers-no-holds-barred-
expansion-strategy-fizzles-in-germany.html?_r=0.
192. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 919, 923–24, 940–
41 (2005).
37
Werbach: The Song Remains the Same: What Cyberlaw Might Teach the Next Int
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
924 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
shield new entrants from regulation and to push down on inflated 
international settlement rates.193 Government action enabled Skype to 
reach critical mass and legitimize its business model.194 During the term 
of Chairman Michael Powell, who led the agency between 2001 and 
2005, the FCC was particularly eager to promote “nascent services” free 
from regulation.195 The FCC’s 2004 order declaring the FreeWorld 
Dialup service outside of traditional communications regulation, while 
not directly applicable to Skype, made clear the agency’s view that 
innovative services offering new options to consumers should be 
encouraged, rather than banned.196 Other agencies took a similar 
approach to nascent digital services at the time. For example, the FDIC’s
2002 decision that the government should not regulate PayPal as a bank 
gave PayPal leverage against state regulators seeking to impose 
significant limitations on its digital payments business.197
Eventually, the solution for Uber, Lyft, and other unauthorized on-
demand services will be government action to create new rules that 
address the necessary public policy considerations, rather than fighting 
over whether the old rules apply.198 Such steps would not only resolve
legitimate public policy concerns, but also legitimize the on-demand 
services and thereby remove obstacles to their further growth and 
innovation. As Airbnb spokesman Christopher Nulty stated in response 
to calls for an ordinance governing short-term rentals in Boston, “We
                                                                                                                     
193. See Chérie R. Kiser & Angela F. Collins, Regulation on the Horizon: Are Regulators 
Poised to Address the Status of IP Telephony?, 11 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 19, 19, 24 (2003);
Jonathan Lee, Microsoft-Skype: The End of the “Free Lunch?” (May 19, 2011, 3:41 AM),
http://www.telecomsense.com/2011/05/microsoft-skype-the-end-of-the.php.
194. Lee, supra note 193. 
195. Kathleen Q. Abernathy, Fed. Comm. Comm’n, Remarks Before the Federal 
Communications Bar Association, New York Chapter (July 11, 2002),
https://transition.fcc.gov/Speeches/Abernathy/2002/spkqa217.html.
196. Petition for Declaratory Ruling That Pulver.com’s Free World Dialup Is Neither 
Telecomms. Nor a Telecomms. Serv., 19 FCC Rcd. 3307, 3317–20 (2004). For more details on 
the FCC’s approach to VOIP, see Kevin Werbach, Off the Hook, 95 CORNELL L. REV. 535, 564–
65 (2010) [hereinafter Werbach, Off the Hook]; Kevin Werbach, No Dialtone: The End of the 
Public Switched Telephone Network, 66 FED. COMM. L.J. 203, 231 (2014) [hereinafter Werbach, 
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197. See Feds: PayPal Not a Bank, CNET (May 19, 2002, 1:09 AM), 
https://www.cnet.com/news/feds-paypal-not-a-bank/.
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especially when it includes preemption of inconsistent or troublesome local regulation. See Light, 
supra note 186.
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want cities to regulate Airbnb and make it easier for regular people to 
share their home, pay their bills and contribute to their community.”199
The key for Skype and PayPal was that regulators were convinced 
these new entrants actually promoted public policy goals, and that 
necessary obligations could be enforced without legacy regulatory 
classifications. In the case of VOIP, the FCC adopted limited 
requirements, such as connection to 911 emergency service, on a 
piecemeal basis, carefully restricting the application to a narrow class of 
services.200 Major on-demand platforms have begun to advocate for a 
similar approach, distinguishing sweeping regulatory classification or 
restrictions they oppose from targeted initiative to address recognized 
problems. For example, Airbnb in November 2015 issued a “Community 
Compact” detailing affirmative steps it would take to work with 
regulators on acknowledged issues.201
The process has gone farthest in the ride-hailing market. At least 
thirty-nine states have adopted laws defining and regulating 
“transportation network companies” (TNCs), with legislation under 
consideration in several others.202 These laws provide an opportunity to 
ensure that the public policy goals of traditional regulations are achieved, 
even when the business model changes. They recognize that a choice 
between ill-fitting legacy rules and no rules at all will not produce a good 
outcome. And they show that the political process can operate 
affirmatively to address conflicts created by new digital businesses. For 
example, the Illinois law mandates:
•Insurance coverage; 
•Driver background checks and licensing requirements;
•Zero tolerance for drugs and alcohol while driving;
                                                                                                                     
199. Matt Rocheleau, Lawmakers Worry Owners Taking Advantage of Airbnb, BOS. GLOBE
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200. See Werbach, No Dialtone, supra note 196, at 232–33.
201. See Mike Isaac, Airbnb Pledges to Work with Cities and Pay ‘Fair Share’ of Taxes,
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 11, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/12/technology/airbnb-pledges-to-
work-with-cities-and-pay-fair-share-of-taxes.html.
202. See Illinois Transportation Network Providers Act, 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 57 (2016); 
Transportation Network Companies, PROP. CASUALTY INSURERS ASS’N AM.,
http://www.pciaa.net/industry-issues/transportation-network-companies (last visited Mar. 16, 
2017); see also Decision Adopting Rules and Regulations to Protect Public Safety While 
Allowing New Entrants to the Transportation Industry, Rulemaking 12-12-011 (Cal. Pub. Util. 
Comm’n July 30, 2013), http://docs.cpuc.ca.gov/PublishedDocs/Published/G000/M077/K112/
77112285.PDF.
39
Werbach: The Song Remains the Same: What Cyberlaw Might Teach the Next Int
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
926 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
•Transparency about fare calculation and receipts;
•Disclose of fare increases during surge pricing; and
•Non-discrimination for passengers.203
The key to these solutions, like the FCC’s response to VOIP, is that 
they involve government action, but not a reflexive insistence on existing 
rules. While on-demand companies may initially reject any talk of 
regulation, they have had to adopt many of the same kinds of measures 
(such as driver background checks for the ride-hailing providers and 
insurance for lodging providers) that regulators might require. An 
authorized regulatory framework could increase consumer confidence in 
on-demand services, allowing them to reach an even larger segment of 
the population. Uber and Airbnb’s willingness to advocate in favor of 
state legislation or municipal rules regulating their businesses, when they 
provide sufficient flexibility, suggest that movement in this direction is 
already occurring.
B.  Algorithmic Monopolies
On-demand services create new competition for entrenched 
incumbents, often in markets subject to significant entry barriers under 
the existing configuration. On the other hand, they can themselves 
achieve a greater level of market power than the companies they displace. 
As already noted, the combination of software-based businesses and 
ubiquitous mobile devices mean that on-demand services can grow at 
hyperbolic rates.204 Network effects mean that successful platforms in 
network markets often tend toward dominant positions.205 Even the most 
mature on-demand markets are still young and fast-changing, so antitrust 
authorities have been hesitant to intervene, but over time, competition 
law concerns are likely to become a major concern in many of these areas. 
As a matter of timing, regulatory classification and basic issues of 
licensing and business authorization will come to a head sooner because 
they consider whether the new services can operate at all. As new 
legislation and collaboration with regulators resolve these issues, antitrust 
issues will become more prominent.
Uber, because of its hyperbolic growth and dominance of the ride-
hailing markets, has already been subject to attacks as a monopolist, after 
                                                                                                                     
203. See Illinois Transportation Network Providers Act, 625 ILL. COMP. STAT. 57.
204. See supra text accompanying note 34.
205. Mark A. Lemley & David McGowan, Legal Implications of Network Economic Effects,
86 CALIF. L. REV. 479, 509, 523, 532, 592 (1998).
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just six years in business.206 In the United States, Uber’s one major 
competitor is Lyft, and it is many times smaller.207 Sidecar, the third 
player in the United States, shut down and sold off its assets in early 
2016.208
Under U.S. antitrust law, having a large market share alone, even one 
considered a monopoly, is not itself grounds for action; the company must 
engage in some anti-competitive action to create or maintain the 
monopoly.209 There have been several accusations of abusive practices 
by Uber, including allegations that Uber local managers deliberately 
booked and then canceled thousands of fake trips on Lyft, occupying Lyft 
drivers so that Uber could gain a competitive advantage.210 As Uber 
moves into other markets (such as delivery of goods) using its fleet of 
drivers,211 it will be subject to concerns about illegally tying to leverage 
its existing dominance. Uber has also continuously reduced prices in 
many markets in competition against Lyft, to the point where, despite 
Uber’s incredible growth, it lost $1.7 billion on $1.2 billion in revenue 
through the first three quarters of 2015, according to leaked documents.212
This behavior opens Uber up to charges of predatory pricing. None of 
                                                                                                                     
206. See Felix Barber, How Do We Fight 21st Century Monopolies Like Amazon, Google 
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Crawford, Getting over Uber, BACKCHANNEL (Oct. 16, 2015), https://backchannel.com/getting-
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market. See id.
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209. Eric K. Clemons & Nehal Madhani, Regulation of Digital Businesses with Natural 
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Google, 27 J. MGMT. INFO. SCI. 43, 72 (2011).
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211. See Douglas Macmillan, The $50 Billion Question: Can Uber Deliver?, WALL ST. J.
(June 15, 2015, 10:34 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/the-50-billion-question-can-uber-
deliver-1434422042.
212. See Eric Newcomer & Ellen Huet, Facing a Price War, Uber Bets on Volume,
BLOOMBERG: BUSINESSWEEK (Jan. 21, 2016, 4:14 PM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/
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these concerns has yet given rise to federal antitrust action against Uber, 
but the potential is clear.
The contrary argument is that on-demand markets have little in the 
way of entry barriers from a technical standpoint. Because so many of the 
foundational aspects of these businesses are in shared infrastructure such 
as wireless connectivity, distributed among users in the case of mobile 
phones, or available as a service at affordable rates through platforms 
such as Amazon’s cloud, startup capital requirements are far lower than 
for the equivalent legacy businesses. Often, significant licensing and 
regulatory requirements operate as entry barriers, but those are the ones 
the new providers disregard.213 As a result, there is reason to believe 
market discipline will self-correct for anti-competitive practices. This 
leads some commenters to suggest there are not significant antitrust 
concerns in the on-demand world.214
This perspective, however, fails to take into account the novel 
competition concerns that arise in an environment where physical assets 
and even people can be treated as information and manipulated through 
software driven by big data analytics.215 The Microsoft antitrust case is 
instructive here.216 The action against Microsoft involved novel questions 
about competition in network markets, the business dynamics of 
software, and the potential of courts and regulators to oversee technology 
choices.217 The court had to decide whether Microsoft was illegally tying 
a browser (a piece of software) into an operating system (also a piece of 
software), and a number of other technical issues.218 From the perspective 
of Netscape and the technology companies that pressed for government 
action, the issue was not regulation of software; it was the chilling of 
opportunities for competition and innovation.219
For today’s on-demand and IoT services, market share in the 
conventional sense is not the only dimension to consider. These platforms 
are based on software algorithms driven by significant volumes of real-
                                                                                                                     
213. See supra Section III.A.
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time data.220 The data itself potentially becomes the foundation for what 
have been called “algorithmic monopolies.”221 The more data a service 
has, the better the quality of its decisions. 222 Even when there are no entry 
barriers in the conventional sense, a dominant player with control over 
data may have an insurmountable edge over potential competitors.223
In the case of Uber, predictive software algorithms decide where to 
direct drivers to minimize wait times for riders, even before the demand 
manifests. And Uber’s surge pricing mechanism increases fares 
(sometimes by a factor of five or more) at times of heavy demand.224
When criticized for charging more at times when riders needed the 
service most (such as during storms), Uber CEO Travis Kalanick stated, 
“We are not setting the price. The market is setting the price . . . . We 
have algorithms to determine what that market is.”225 Kalanick’s point 
was that the market-clearing price reflected supply and demand, and 
surge pricing incentivized more drivers to take to the roads. His phrasing, 
however, was telling. The market “is” whatever Uber’s algorithms say it
is. The software controls not only the price, but the timing and boundaries 
of surge pricing, as well as what information is provided to drivers when.
Uber can choose what factors to use in “determining” the market, 
including rewarding or disincentivizing certain classes of drivers, or even
elbowing out competitors.226 The details and operation of the algorithms 
                                                                                                                     
220. See Matthew Stoller, Uber’s Algorithmic Monopoly, OBSERVATIONS ON CREDIT &
SURVEILLANCE (Apr. 9, 2014, 6:45 PM), http://mattstoller.tumblr.com/post/82233202309/ubers-
algorithmic-monopoly-we-are-not-setting.
221. See id. 
222. A similar argument can be made about Google, which is able to provide the best search 
results because it has by far the largest share of queries. See Eric K. Clemons & Nehal Madhani, 
Regulation of Digital Businesses with Natural Monopolies or Third-Party Payment Business 
Models: Antitrust Lessons from the Analysis of Google, 27 J. MGMT. INFO. SCI. 43, 52, 54, 66
(2010). However, the search market is substantially different from on-demand services in that it 
is entirely digital, services are offered for free and monetized through advertising, and a search 
engine’s primary function is to direct users elsewhere. 
223. See ALLEN P. GRUNES & MAURICE E. STUCKE, NO MISTAKE ABOUT IT: THE IMPORTANT 
ROLE OF ANTITRUST IN THE ERA OF BIG DATA 1–3 (2015), http://www.americanbar.org/
content/dam/aba/publishing/antitrust_source/apr15_grunes_4_22f.authcheckdam.pdf. But see 
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are secret, so it is impossible to know from observation whether Uber is 
using them in anti-competitive or discriminatory ways.227
Another concern involves the potential that such decision making
algorithms can cooperate with one another to engage in price fixing. Such 
“algorithmic cartels” may develop even without explicit instructions 
from the service providers because they represent an efficient solution to 
maximize each firm’s profits.228 Concerns about these scenarios are 
already developing around electronic commerce sites such as Amazon, 
where rival “bots” do battle to price merchandise on user-managed virtual 
storefronts.229 In an on-demand world, more and more resources that were 
previously subject to fixed prices or delivered by traditional service 
providers will be available through dynamically created algorithmic 
marketplaces. Just as the Microsoft antitrust trial forced an examination 
of the growing importance of personal computer software to existing and 
developing industries, on-demand services will bring algorithmic 
competition policy questions to the fore.
Finally, as the Internet of the World advances, on-demand services 
will become more foundational for commerce and communities. At some 
point, there should be consideration of whether some of them reach the 
level of importance coupled with potential for abuse that has in other 
industries given rise to utility regulation.230 Certain competitive tactics 
that are otherwise legitimate are off the table for firms that enjoy the 
benefits of controlling essential services. 
As with the Microsoft trial, it will likely be current and potential 
competitors to the dominant on-demand providers who push for a fuller 
examination of the novel antitrust concerns. The dominant players may 
find that pulling back the curtain somewhat and providing access to 
information about algorithms or commitments against certain behaviors 
is preferable to risking an antitrust showdown. The FTC has formed a 
new Office of Technology Research and Investigation, which among 
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other things has a mandate to examine algorithmic transparency.231
C.  Taxation and Fees 
As described above, concerns about collection of sales taxes on e-
commerce and imposition of discriminatory taxes on online activity were 
significant in the early days of the commercial internet.232 Thanks to the 
ITFA and negotiated resolution, potential problems were overcome, or at 
least delayed to the point where they could be addressed through 
compromise.233
The growth of the On-Demand Economy raises two kinds of tax 
issues. The first involves collection of personal taxes from workers 
providing on-demand services, such as Uber and Lyft drivers.234 Though 
complicated by legal uncertainty about the status of these workers as 
employees or independent contractors, reference to existing rules can 
generally resolve such tax issues.235 The biggest issues are difficulties of 
awareness, reporting, and enforcement for large numbers of individuals 
in unfamiliar roles.236 In contrast, questions about the responsibility of 
the on-demand providers themselves to remit taxes and fees leads to 
thornier issues. These payments are a direct cost, so these companies are 
obviously eager to avoid being subject to them. Yet their failure to pay 
raises issues of equity with pre-existing providers, and, as with the sales 
taxation issues for e-commerce, drains funding from local and state 
governments.
1. We’re Not Tax Collectors . . . or Are We?
The On-Demand Economy company most directly confronting 
taxation is Airbnb, which allows people to offer short-term rentals of 
apartments, houses, or rooms. Founded in 2008, Airbnb has grown almost 
as rapidly as Uber.237 In 2014, it averaged over one million guests per 
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month, and it now operates in over 30,000 cites worldwide.238 In general, 
Airbnb has taken a more conciliatory line toward governments than 
Uber.239 With regard to taxes, however, it has tussled with cities over the 
proper solution.240
Most major American cities impose a tax, in some cases a substantial 
one (14.5% in San Francisco, for example) on hotel rooms.241 The hotel 
operator collects these taxes.242 This contrasts with the Uber situation, 
where there is an option to tax individual workers as independent 
contractors if income taxes are not collected by Uber itself as an 
employer. Because Airbnb styles itself as a passive intermediary, it 
originally declined to add these local taxes to the rates that its hosts 
charged to their guests.243 From cities’ viewpoints, however, this was a 
clear evasion of taxes by a direct competitor to traditional hotels.244
Nationwide, Airbnb was estimated to owe as much as $200 million.245
The analogous issue for Uber involves fees imposed on for-hire 
transportation services to contribute to other government programs. In 
New York City, taxis must collect a fifty-cent fee on every fare, which 
the city uses to fund mass transit.246 Uber refuses to do so, although it 
charges all riders a one-dollar “Safe Rides Fee” in connection with its 
own costs for background checks and other safety-oriented activities.247
The transit fee does not directly affect taxi or Uber rides, but it contributes 
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within a few years. See Michael B. Baker, Barclays: Airbnb Usage to Surpass Hotel Cos., but Not 
for Business Travel, BUS. TRAVEL NEWS (Jan. 16, 2015), http://www.businesstravelnews.com/
Hotel-News/Barclays-Airbnb-Usage-To-Surpass-Hotel-Cos-But-Not-For-Business-Travel.
239. See Khadem, supra note 237. 
240. See Joyce E. Cutler, Cities Grappling with Challenges of How to Tax, Regulate Short-
Term Rentals, BLOOMBERG BNA (Oct. 21, 2014), http://www.bna.com/cities-grappling-
challenges-n17179897258/; Brad Tuttle, The Other Complication for Airbnb and the Sharing 
Economy: Taxes, TIME (June 15, 2013), http://business.time.com/2013/06/15/the-other-
complication-for-airbnb-and-the-sharing-economy-taxes.
241. See Cutler, supra note 240.
242. See James Mak, Taxing Hotel Room Rentals in the U.S., 27 J. TRAVEL RES. 10, 10 
(1988). 
243. See Tuttle, supra note 240 (observing Airbnb’s policy for reporting income, in that “the 
rules are unclear, [and] enforcement is almost nonexistent”).
244. Id. 
245. Phillip Matier & Andrew Ross, Airbnb Pays Tax Bill of “Tens of Millions” to S.F.,
SFGATE (Feb. 18, 2015, 8:48 PM), http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/matier-ross/article/M-R-
Airbnb-pays-tens-of-millions-in-back-6087802.php. 
246. See Bill de Blasio, A Fair Ride for New Yorkers: How the City Should Respond to the 
Rapid Rise of Uber, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (July 18, 2015, 11:00 AM), 
http://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/bill-de-blasio-fair-ride-new-yorkers-article-1.2296041.
247. Biz Carson, Here’s How Much Uber Charges for “Safe Ride” in Different US Cities,
BUS. INSIDER (Oct. 16, 2015, 12:11 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/us-cities-with-highest-
uber-safe-rides-fees-2015-10.
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to the overall quality of transit in the city, particularly the level of traffic 
congestion.248
While there are arguments against charging taxi riders to help pay for 
subway expenses, they apply as much to taxis as Uber. The only reason 
Uber currently does not pay is that in New York City, it is classified as a 
livery car service, not a taxi provider, and the fee was only imposed on 
taxis.249 If Uber contributed, it would generate an estimated $70 million 
per year for mass transit in New York.250
2. The Taxman Cometh
The debates over taxation and fees for on-demand services began as 
classic conflicts between governments seeking to impose obligations and 
new companies seeking to avoid them. Yet fairly quickly, there has been 
a significant shift. In particular, Airbnb has changed its tune. In February 
2015, it paid an estimated $25 million in back taxes to the city of San 
Francisco.251 It is negotiating with several cities about arrangements that 
would require it to collect hotel taxes from its hosts.252 The company 
wants these arrangements because they come with explicit authorization 
for Airbnb short-term rentals, which violate regulations in many 
jurisdictions.253 The company just serves as a pass-through for the taxes, 
which it takes out of hosts’ share of revenues.254 So there is no direct 
financial cost for Airbnb to comply.255
Despite the company’s newfound support for tax collection, Airbnb 
has not entirely given up its cyberlibertarian instincts. After the company 
                                                                                                                     
248. See de Blasio, supra note 246 (stating that “[m]ore than 2,000 new for-hire vehicles are 
being added to [the] streets [of New York] every month”). 
249. See Jose Martinez, Proposal to Add 50-Cent Surcharge onto Car Service Rides to Fund 
MTA Gaines Steam, NY1 (June 17, 2015, 10:15 PM), http://www.ny1.com/nyc/all-boroughs/
news/2015/06/17/proposal-to-add-50-cent-surcharge-onto-car-service-rides-to-fund-mta-gains-
steam.html. 
250. See id. 
251. See Matier & Ross, supra note 245.
252. Id. 
253. See Ann Carrns, Lodging Taxes and Airbnb Hosts: Who Pays, and How, N.Y. TIMES
(June 16, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/17/your-money/lodging-taxes-and-airbnb-
hosts-who-pays-and-how.html?_r=0; Alison Griswold, Why Airbnb Desperately Wants to Pay 
Hotel Taxes, SLATE (Feb. 13, 2015, 7:00 PM), http://www.slate.com/articles/business/
moneybox/2015/02/airbnb_hotel_taxes_why_does_the_sharing_economy_startup_want_to_pay
_them.html.
254. Carrns, supra note 253. 
255. Reducing hosts’ revenues may lead fewer hosts to participate (thus reducing Airbnb’s 
revenues) or cause hosts to raise rates to compensate (thus potentially suppressing demand). Either 
way, there could be some negative financial consequences from Airbnb’s decision. Now that the 
company is well-established and dominant in its market, however, the displacement effects for 
both hosts and guests are likely to be limited.
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began remitting hotel taxes in San Francisco, it ran an advertising 
campaign on light rail stations around the city.256 The ads, which included 
lines such as “Dear Public Library System, We hope you use some of the 
$12 million in hotel taxes to keep the library open later,” provoked 
significant controversy.257 Airbnb seemed to be congratulating itself for 
complying with the law and treating government agencies with sarcasm. 
The company quickly apologized and promised to take them down.258
Nonetheless, the incident suggests Airbnb has not yet fully 
accommodated itself to engaging with government. Based on the pattern 
in other contexts, it is just a matter of time.
Uber is also moving toward acceptance of certain taxes or fees. Under 
a temporary deal with New York City, it has agreed to explore ways to 
contribute to mass transit.259 The company argues that it indirectly makes 
significant contributions to mass transit services through the sales taxes 
it collects, but those are not dedicated to any specific use.260 The issue 
has not yet been resolved, but the willingness of both sides to discuss a 
solution suggests that progress is being made. 
Ultimately, the differential treatment involves the city’s decision to 
impose the fee on taxis but not car services. If the city imposed on all for-
hire transportation providers, the argument for excluding Uber and Lyft 
would be weak. At that point, the debate could properly focus on whether 
such a fee is a good means of funding mass transit, not the technology 
used to provide the for-hire services. Perhaps the city should use other 
funding sources or should exempt carpooling services, such as Uber’s
UberPool or Lyft’s Lyft Line, that share cars among multiple riders.261
Ride-hailing services are likely to be the catalyst for re-examining 
many such transportation-oriented funding mechanisms at the local level. 
The equilibrium points will inevitably be somewhere between the status 
quo in which Uber and Lyft are non-compliant and the elimination of all 
                                                                                                                     
256. Julia Carrie Wong, Airbnb Apologizes for Passive Aggressive Ads on Muni Shelters, SF
WEEKLY (Oct. 21, 2015, 6:22 PM), http://archives.sfweekly.com/thesnitch/2015/10/21/passive-
aggressive-pro-airbnb-ads-appear-on-muni-shleters.
257. Id.
258. See id.
259. Associated Press, Uber Strikes Surprise Last-Minute Deal with New York City,
CHRONICLE (July 23, 2015, 4:09 AM), http://www.chroniclet.com/national-news/2015/07/
23/Uber-strikes-surprise-last-minute-deal-with-New-York-City.html.
260. Dan Rivoli, Uber Pushes Against Mayor de Blasio That It Doesn’t Pay Enough in 
Taxes, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Aug. 24, 2015, 2:30 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-
york/uber-claims-pays-fair-share-nyc-taxes-article-1.2335169.
261. Andrew J. Hawkins, Even Cynical New Yorkers Don’t Mind Sharing Uber Rides with 
Strangers, VERGE (Nov. 9, 2015, 4:17 PM), http://www.theverge.com/2015/11/9/9698658/uber-
uberpool-nyc-october-ride-share-numbers; Meet Lyft Line, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/line (last 
visited Mar. 16, 2017). 
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such revenue sources from the ride-hailing industry. The example of sales 
taxes for e-commerce shows that complications can eventually be 
resolved in a manner that does not overly disadvantage innovative new 
market entrants. The process may not be easy, and some government 
actors will certainly continue to press for discriminatory or onerous taxes, 
but there is no realistic alternative. As with the legal classification of on-
demand services, acceptance of the government role will speed the 
resolution process.
D. Platform Responsibility
On December 5, 2014, a young woman stepped into a hired car in New 
Delhi, India.262 Instead of taking his passenger to her destination, the 
driver, Shiv Kumar Yadav, drove to a secluded location and raped her.263
Eight weeks later, the woman filed a lawsuit over her assault. There were 
two unusual features of the suit. The defendant was not Yadav.264 And 
the forum for the litigation was not India; it was the Northern District of 
California.265 The target was Uber, for which Yadav worked at the time 
of the attack.266
The New Delhi case generated significant notoriety, but it was not
unique. In numerous other incidents passengers have accused drivers for 
Uber and similar on-demand transportation services of misconduct.267
These involve sexual assaults,268 physical attacks,269 and injuries due to 
                                                                                                                     
262. See Dominic Rushe, Delhi Woman Sues Uber for “Negligence and Fraud” After 
Alleged Rape, GUARDIAN (Jan. 29, 2015, 7:01 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/
jan/29/delhi-woman-sues-uber-rape-negligence.
263. Id. 
264. Uber classified him, like all Uber drivers, as an independent contractor. Id.
265. Id. 
266. The plaintiff voluntarily terminated the lawsuit prior to trial several months later, 
apparently after settling with Uber. See Dan Levine, Indian Woman Who Sued Uber over Rape 
Accusation Ends Lawsuit, REUTERS (Sept. 1, 2015, 3:13 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-
uber-tech-rape-settlement-idUSKCN0R14GV20150901.
267. See, e.g., Mark Macmurdo, Hold the Phone! “Peer-to-Peer” Ridesharing Services, 
Regulation, and Liability, 76 LA. L. REV. 307, 337–38 (2015) (citing Teixeira v. Car Cab Three, 
Inc., 1994 Mass. App. Div. 154 (Dist. Ct. 1994)) (arguing that Uber and Lyft should be held liable 
for the acts of drivers regardless of how the drivers are classified).
268. See, e.g., Sharon Chen, Ride Share Driver Accused of Sexually Assaulting Teen Girls,
FOX 5, (Sept. 21, 2016, 9:27 AM), http://fox5sandiego.com/2016/09/21/rideshare-driver-arrested-
for-assaulting-multiple-customers/; Marisa Kendall, Uber Sued over Alleged Rapes by Drivers,
CONSUMER FED’N CAL. (Oct. 9, 2015), https://consumercal.org/uber-sued-over-alleged-rapes-by-
drivers/.
269. See, e.g., Ellen Huet, Uber Rider Might Lose an Eye from Driver’s Hammer Attack. 
Could Uber Be Held Liable?, FORBES (Sept. 30, 2014, 9:37 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/ellenhuet/ 2014/09/30/uber-driver-hammer-attack-liability. 
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crashes allegedly involving reckless driving.270 Airbnb had its own 
scandal in 2011, when a guest robbed one of Airbnb’s hosts, and the 
company tried to prevent the host from reporting about it.271 Sporadic 
reports of similar incidents continue.272
In these situations, the question is what is needed to ensure against 
harmful conduct by individuals on the platform. This directly parallels a 
key issue dating from the early days of cyberlaw: intermediary liability. 
By their nature, on-demand services use networked software platforms 
and mobile devices to connect otherwise unaffiliated service providers 
and customers. They take individuals who otherwise might not even be 
offering commercial services and incorporate them into what feels to 
users like a huge, well-oiled business operation. In this way, they are 
similar to first-generation e-commerce sites such as eBay, which enables 
individual sellers to reach huge markets. When something goes wrong, 
does it make more sense to treat the sellers as atomic units or as cogs in 
a larger machine, operated by the platform intermediary?
1. Intermediary as Software Provider
Uber and Lyft declare in their terms of service that they are just 
software providers and thus not responsible for the conduct of drivers 
who happen to use their software to find riders.273 In Uber’s telling, it 
serves as a directory matching drivers with customers: essentially, a 
souped-up phone book.274 This claim is eerily similar to the arguments 
from P2P services such as Napster and Grokster in the 1990s that they 
were merely directories connecting users interested in sharing files.275
                                                                                                                     
270. See, e.g., Ron Lieber, Fatal Collision Makes Car-Sharing Worries No Longer 
Theoretical, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 13, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/04/14/your-
money/relayrides-accident-raises-questions-on-liabilities-of-car-sharing.html.
271. See Hayley Tsukayama, Airbnb Burglary Victim Says Company Tried to Quiet Her,
WASH. POST (July 29, 2011), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/faster-forward/post/airbnb-
robbery-victim-says-company-tried-to-quiether/2011/07/29/gIQA7R03gI_blog.html.
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DAILY NEWS (Mar. 17, 2014, 12:16 AM), http://www.nydailynews.com/new-york/unexpected-
sex-party-destroys-pricy-chelsea-apartment-article-1.1723825.
273. See Lyft Terms of Service, LYFT, https://www.lyft.com/terms (last updated Sept. 30, 
2016); Uber Terms and Conditions, UBER, https://www.uber.com/legal/usa/terms (last visited 
Feb. 16, 2017).
274. See Emily Badger, The Strange Tale of an Uber Car Crash and What It Means for the 
Future of Auto Insurance, CITYLAB (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.citylab.com/commute/
2013/09/real-future-ride-sharing-may-all-come-down-insurance/6832/ (“Some of them, like 
Uber, argue that they have created primarily technology platforms, modern-day phone books that 
connect people who already have cars (or car services) to people who want to ride in them.”).
275. See JOHN ALDERMAN, SONIC BOOM: NAPSTER, MP3, AND THE NEW PIONEERS OF MUSIC
140–41 (2001) (including Napster attorney David Boies’ statement to Wired magazine in which 
he described Napster as a “directory-service provider”).
50
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/5
2017] THE SONG REMAINS THE SAME 937
Those parties litigated those cases under copyright law, which is a strict 
liability offense that includes a concept of secondary liability where 
facilitators have knowledge and control over infringing activities.276 In 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd.,277 the Supreme 
Court imposed liability even when the P2P services were fully 
distributed.278 The Court concluded that awareness and encouragement 
of widespread infringement was sufficient, even if the services had no 
records of any individual transaction.279
The “directory” argument has met with stiff resistance. It is formally 
true that Uber and Lyft own no cars and Airbnb owns no hotels, but they 
provide a service offering that competes directly with those who do. 
Riders look for “an Uber,” not a directory of drivers who happen to be 
nearby. The basic value proposition of on-demand services, and the 
Internet of the World more broadly, is the ability to stitch together 
otherwise independent entities into a seamless network.280 This is, after 
all, how companies such as Uber and Airbnb have grown so fast and 
transformed markets so dramatically. The argument that they are merely 
incidental facilitators of direct transactions between individuals flies in 
the face of reality.
Perhaps more importantly, the On-Demand Economy depends on 
trust.281 For most individuals to feel comfortable stepping into a 
stranger’s car or apartment, they need to have some confidence above and 
beyond ordinary social mores. On-demand providers achieve this 
primarily through reputation and rating systems that overcome classic 
information asymmetries.282 They also screen providers in their network, 
                                                                                                                     
276. See Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster, Ltd., 545 U.S. 913, 929–30  
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282. See Adam Thierer et al., How the Internet, the Sharing Economy, and Reputational 
Feedback Mechanisms Solve the “Lemons Problem,” 70 U. MIAMI L. REV. 830, 855 (2016)
(explaining how reputation and rating systems allow drivers and passengers to gain information 
about the other); Ufford, supra note 281.
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and remove those who engage in misconduct or provide poor service.283
Customers are therefore trusting the platform, not the individual 
providers. As a practical matter, individual providers of on-demand 
services may not have the resources to fully compensate users for 
injuries.284 Unsurprisingly, therefore, neither regulators nor users have 
been satisfied that on-demand providers can shift liability to providers in 
their networks.285
2. Intermediaries and Their Providers
Another dimension concerns the legal relationship between the 
frontline providers and the on-demand platforms. For services such as 
Uber and Lyft, the question is whether the individuals who interact with 
customers should be classified as employees or independent 
contractors.286 Classification as employees, which the on-demand 
platforms generally resist,287 could among other things impose 
respondeat superior liability for those employees’ actions.288 More 
generally, it would establish the networks as the primary service 
providers, rather than merely coordination tools, for collections of 
independent entrepreneurs. A decision to categorize Uber and Lyft 
drivers therefore also functions to categorize Uber and Lyft. 
The “Internet of Things” conception of on-demand services 
controlling formerly unconnected objects through the network289
potentially cuts in both directions here. On the one hand, emphasizing the 
constitutive and directive role of the on-demand software platform, with 
the people at the edges operating as mere extensions, cuts against the 
story that the workers are independent contractors who just happen to use 
a mobile app. On the other hand, providers will be less interested in 
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note 11.
288. See Jessica L. Hubley, Online Consent and the On-Demand Economy: An Approach for 
the Millennial Circumstance, 8 HASTINGS SCI. & TECH. L.J. 1, 9 (2016).
289. See supra notes 20–26 and accompanying text (describing on-demand platforms as 
examples of the Internet of Things).
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treating workers as employees if they see them as fungible cogs in a 
system. The Internet of the World dramatically alters the dimension that 
traditionally distinguishes employees from contractors: control.290
Courts have not definitively resolved the worker classification 
issue.291 A class action lawsuit in California arguing that ride-hailing 
platform drivers are employees survived summary judgment in spring 
2015, with a trial set for June 2016.292 The California Labor Commission 
ruled in 2015 that Uber drivers are employees;293 Uber appealed. As with 
the regulatory classification of on-demand services, a new legal category 
with elements of both employees and independent contractors may 
ultimately be needed.294 A key question will be the degree of 
responsibility the platform providers should assume.
However courts resolve the labor classification, the broader issue is 
what level of responsibility should inure to new kinds of platforms. 
Among the signal innovations of the Internet of the World is the way it 
engenders novel forms of intermediation. Uber, Lyft, Airbnb, and other 
on-demand services all use mobile devices and networked software to 
turn individual service providers into arms of centralized platforms. 
Internet of Things services do the same with sensor devices.295 When 
something goes wrong, it is no longer a question of design or 
manufacturing flaws in individual products. For example, a software 
glitch at the beginning of 2016 caused widespread failures of Nest 
network-connected adaptive thermostats in the middle of winter, leaving
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292. See O’Connor v. Uber Techs., Inc., 82 F. Supp. 3d 1133, 1135 (N.D. Cal. 2015); see 
also Joel Rosenblatt, Uber Loses Bid to Pause Drivers Group Lawsuit as Trial Looms,
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http://www.bloombergview.com/articles/2015-06-23/uber-drivers-are-neither-employees-nor-
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owners worried about the effects of freezing houses on small children and 
pipes.296 Software vendors such as Microsoft have successfully avoided 
liability for defects and security flaws, based on contractual disclaimers 
and limitations on liability,297 but the Internet of the World potentially 
turns everything into a software system. 
3. The Safe Harbors of Sections 230 and 512
As with the other current legal and regulatory debates, there is a handy 
precedent in the annals of cyberlaw. In the Congressional compromise to 
incorporate the CDA into the bicameral version of the 
Telecommunications Act of 1996,298 Congress paired the provisions 
imposing liability for online indecency and obscenity with provisions 
protecting online intermediaries.299 The latter language, codified as 
Section 230 of Title 47 of the U.S. Code, includes two main elements. 
The first recites a Congressional desire to preserve the unregulated 
Internet.300 This language, unmoored from its companion provisions on 
indecency, has been cited ever since in support of non-regulatory 
positions toward online services.301
The second component of Section 230 is the safe harbor regime. 
Online intermediaries are not considered publishers or speakers of 
information provided on their services by other content providers, 
including individuals.302 Section 230 protects them against liability for 
taking good faith efforts to block inappropriate or harmful material, 
which otherwise might be seen as evidence they can exercise editorial 
control.303 By immunizing intermediaries for such “good Samaritan”
actions, the law facilitated dialogue between these providers and those 
seeking removal of materials. The unanimous Supreme Court decision in 
Reno v. ACLU struck the substantive provisions of the CDA restricting 
indecent online speech.304 However, Section 230 remained good law. 
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Section 230 expressly does not apply to copyright violations.305
However, Congress created a similar safe harbor structure under Section 
512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act.306 There, providers enjoy 
a safe harbor from liability for content provided by others so long as they 
designate an agent to receive complaints about copyright infringement, 
take down infringing material when notified, and offer subscribers the 
opportunity for a counter-notification if material was taken down in 
error.307
These safe harbor provisions resulted from compromises between 
those worried about letting intermediaries off the hook for enabling 
distribution of harmful or infringing material and those worried about 
chilling effects to legitimate speech and commerce.308 Neither side got 
exactly what it wanted, especially in the copyright context, but the 
arrangements were important foundations for the subsequent growth of 
online services and e-commerce. 
In the years since 1996, the Section 230 safe harbor has become a 
significant protector of online intermediaries against a raft of legal claims
based on the actions of their users. Although not without its critics,309
Section 230 has been labeled one of the most important legislative 
enactments facilitating the growth of online services and e-commerce.310
Parties have challenged its invocation in hundreds of cases, and while 
courts have not always been consistent, the safe harbor has been an 
effective shield against an extraordinarily broad array of claims.311
                                                                                                                     
305. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(2) (2012).
306. Pub. L. No. 105-304, § 202, 112 Stat. 2860, 2877–78 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. 
§ 512 (2012)).
307. 17 U.S.C. § 512.
308. See Jennifer M. Urban & Laura Quilter, Efficient Process or “Chilling Effects”? 
Takedown Notices Under Section 512 of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 22 SANTA CLARA 
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 621, 621–22 (2006).
309. See, e.g., Doug Lichtman & Eric Posner, Holding Internet Service Providers 
Accountable, 14 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 221, 230 (2006) (describing how indirect liability is 
preferable where the potentially liable party is in a good position to detect and deter bad acts, such
as in the employment context); Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet 
Intermediary Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 250 (2005) (proposing a “mature scheme 
of regulation that limits the social costs of illegal Internet conduct in the most cost-effective 
manner”).
310. David S. Ardia, Free Speech Savior or Shield for Scoundrels: An Empirical Study of 
Intermediary Immunity Under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, 43 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 373, 379–80 (2010); H. Brian Holland, In Defense of Online Intermediary Immunity: 
Facilitating Communities of Modified Exceptionalism, 56 U. KAN. L. REV. 369, 369 (2008); Mark 
A. Lemley, Rationalizing Internet Safe Harbors, 6 J. ON TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 101, 102–
03 (2007); see also Brief of Amici Curiae Internet Law Professors in Support of Appellees 
Google, Inc. et al. at 4–6, Garcia v. Google, Inc., 786 F.3d 733 (9th Cir. 2015) (No. 12-57302).
311. See Ardia, supra note 310, at 411, 414.
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Section 230 covers interactive computer services, which “provide[] or 
enable[] computer access by multiple users to a computer server, 
including specifically . . . access to the Internet.”312 It protects internet 
service providers and all manner of online content and application 
services, but not services delivered in the physical world.313 The question 
is therefore what should be learned from the historical experience, and 
how government should craft an intermediary liability or safe harbor 
regime for the new generation of platforms. 
4. Defining Platform Responsibilities
Intermediaries are often the best, if not the only, entities able to police 
behavior of participants in their network. Only they have visibility across
the ecosystem and real-time data on activities of all participants.314
Platform providers may be the only entities capable of taking effective 
enforcement action against those who cause injuries, or they may be the 
only actor involved with sufficient resources to compensate the injured.
The threat of liability creates a strong incentive for platforms to screen 
participants and take action against those who cause harm.315
On the other hand, excessive liability risk can prevent providers from 
offering valuable services or create perverse incentives. Congress 
designed the Section 230 safe harbor to address the concern that an 
intermediary would avoid policing activity out of fear that it would 
become liable as a publisher for exercising editorial control.316 Congress 
drafted the safe harbor provisions of the 1990s, especially the Section 512 
notice and takedown language for copyright infringement, to balance 
these concerns.317 The legal regime shapes business models as much as it 
allocates responsibilities for compensation.318
                                                                                                                     
312. 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(2) (2012).
313. Airbnb has asserted that it falls within the Section 230 safe harbor, although this claim 
has not been tested. See Brittany McNamara, Airbnb: A Not-So-Safe Resting Place, 13 COLO.
TECH. L.J. 149, 164 (2015) (noting that Section 230 is one of the most influential reasons why 
Airbnb can succeed); see also Lisa Fickenscher, Hotels Girding for a Fight Against Airbnb,
CRAIN’S N.Y. BUS. (Aug. 19, 2013, 5:00 AM), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20130819/
HOSPITALITY_TOURISM/130819909/hotels-girding-for-a-fight-against-airbnb (explaining 
that regulatory authorities have hesitated to sue Airbnb because of the Section 230 safe harbor).
314. See Ardia, supra note 310, at 377 (“[P]rivate intermediaries transport, host, and index 
tens of billions of pages of content online.”).
315. Macmurdo, supra note 267, at 326. 
316. See Zeran v. Am. Online, Inc., 129 F.3d 327, 331 (4th Cir. 1997); Ardia, supra note 
310, at 410 (stating that one purpose of the amendment that became the Section 230 safe harbor 
was “encouraging private efforts to deal with Internet indecency”).
317. See Ardia, supra note 310, at 391 n.66. 
318. The pattern continues to this day. For example, the anonymous location-based 
messaging service YikYak, created in late 2013, has provoked controversy on many college 
campuses due to abusive and threatening messages. Thanks to Section 230, it has not been held 
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Something similar could help to align incentives for networked 
businesses of the new internet economy to take appropriate responsibility 
as intermediaries, without burdening them with excessive liability.319 As 
with the other issues, the question should be how to ensure appropriate 
protection for customers in the most efficient and effective way, while 
still supporting innovation and growth of new services.
When pressed, on-demand providers have been willing to step in with 
creative solutions. Following the 2011 incident, Airbnb began offering a 
$1 million “Protection Guarantee” for its hosts.320 This amount is in 
addition to renters’ or homeowners’ insurance, which sometimes does not 
apply when hosts rent out space to third parties.321 In India, Uber 
introduced a “panic button” for riders to address concerns about sexual 
assaults by drivers.322
Another mechanism is private insurance. On-demand service 
providers often only have personal insurance policies, which are not well-
adapted to the commercial services they are offering.323 Commercial 
policies, however, generally are not designed for individuals acting as 
drivers or residential hosts on an episodic, part-time basis.324 And even 
when providers have insurance, the question is whether it applies any 
time they use the on-demand app or only when they interact with a 
customer.325 These limitations are gradually falling away, in part due to 
government action. One of the key developments allowing adoption of 
TNC laws has been negotiation of a compromise between ride-hailing 
companies and insurance companies regarding insurance requirements 
for drivers.326 Most states have used the resulting model language to 
                                                                                                                     
liable for defamatory content posted by its users, but it has been able to remove content or turn 
users over to law enforcement authorities in cases of serious criminal activity or physical danger.
See Jonathan Mahler, Who Spewed That Abuse? Anonymous Yik Yak App Isn’t Telling, N.Y. TIMES
(Mar. 8, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/09/technology/popular-yik-yak-app-confers-
anonymity-and-delivers-abuse.html.
319. See Katz, supra note 3, at 1106–07.
320. See The $1,000,000 Host Guarantee, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/guarantee (last 
visited Mar. 28, 2017).
321. Id.
322. Associated Press, Uber Introduces “Panic Button” in India, GUARDIAN (Feb. 9, 2015,
7:08 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2015/feb/09/uber-introduces-panic-button-
in-india.
323. See Catherine Lee Rassman, Regulating Rideshare Without Stifling Innovation: 
Examining the Drivers, the Insurance “Gap,” and Why Pennsylvania Should Get on Board, 15
PITT. J. TECH. L. & POL’Y 81, 88 (2014).
324. Id. 
325. See id. This issue is known as the “insurance gap.” Id.
326. See Anthony R. O’Donnell, Insurer-TNC Compromise Paves Way for Rideshare 
Insurance Regulation, INS. INNOVATION REP. (Mar. 31, 2015), http://iireporter.com/insurer-tnc-
compromise-paves-way-for-rideshare-insurance-regulation.
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impose mandatory insurance requirements on drivers, and in response, 
insurance companies have begun to offer policies tailored to the new 
business model.327
The network neutrality experience shows that a substantial segment 
of internet users and startups may advocate rules that place greater 
obligations on service providers, despite their instinctive resistance to 
government regulation.328 Indeed, opponents of regulation for on-demand 
services have begun to endorse measures to protect workers and 
consumers.329 In November 2015, founders or CEOs of several on-
demand providers including Lyft, Handy, and Instacart signed onto a 
letter urging the creation of new social safety net mechanisms for on-
demand workers.330
IV. WE CAN WORK IT OUT
The pioneers of the On-Demand Economy, Internet of Things, and 
Big Data face a similar challenge to Napster and YouTube. Those that 
think they can ignore or challenge existing laws indefinitely may find 
themselves in jeopardy. Those that find ways to align interests will 
succeed. Yet at the same time, policymakers who think they can simply 
extend old rules to new services will encounter both legal and practical 
difficulties. Once government is at the table and both sides come forward 
with good faith, together they can and will develop creative solutions.
A. The Digital Dichotomy
In 1999, writer Andrew Shapiro published The Control Revolution, a 
perceptive examination of the tensions between the decentralizing power 
of the internet and the centralizing pressures of legal and business 
forces.331 Shapiro’s thesis was that the rise of online activity would 
                                                                                                                     
327. See, e.g., California Commissioner OKs New Insurance Products to Fill Ridesharing 
Gap, INS. J. (Jan. 21, 2016), http://www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2016/01/21/
395994.htm (describing how USAA and State Farm recently introduced gap-closing insurance to 
Uber and Lyft drivers in California). 
328. See supra Subsection II.C.3.
329. Arun Sundararajan, A Safety Net Fit for the Sharing Economy, FIN. TIMES (June 22, 
2015, 6:07 PM), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/4af5/d34faa19590cfdb4ba127e7b5da84
e2e736a.pdf.
330. See Agence France Press, “Sharing Economy” Firms Urge Safety Net for Workers,
YAHOO! NEWS (Nov. 10, 2015), https://www.yahoo.com/news/sharing-economy-firms-urge-
safety-net-workers-162802278.html.
331. See generally ANDREW L. SHAPIRO, THE CONTROL REVOLUTION (1999) (arguing that 
there has been a shift of control due to society’s ever-increasing use of the internet). This finding 
reflects deeper structures of networked activities. A similar pattern of alternating centralization 
and decentralization explains the development of the infrastructure of the internet, which network 
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produce a zig-zag path of development.332 Explosions of bottom-up
innovation would provoke excessive regulation, which in turn birthed 
new efforts to circumvent legal and other constraints.333 Both the upstarts 
and the establishment, Shapiro argued, were susceptible to “oversteer,” a
tendency to over-correct for legitimate problems.334 Both sides would 
eventually move to the middle as they recognized the need for balance, 
although the process of getting there might be costly.335
The internet’s development in the twenty-first century has played out 
largely as Shapiro predicted. From Napster to PayPal to YouTube to 
Skype to Facebook, the great innovative business success stories 
involved waves of hype about unstoppable disruption alternating with 
periods of backlash about threats to individuals and well-functioning 
markets.336 Like a pendulum gradually narrowing its arc, extreme 
libertarianism and regulatory revanchism gradually gave way to practical 
solutions in the middle.337 This story describes the website-dominated era 
of Web 1.0 as well as the social/mobile/app world of Web 2.0. There is 
every reason to expect the pattern to continue. 
The problems described in The Control Revolution can be traced to a 
core misunderstanding: the digital dichotomy.338 The starting point of this 
way of thinking is that online transactions or connections are 
ontologically different than interactions in the “real world.”339 To this 
perspective, e-commerce is distinct from brick-and-mortar commerce, 
and online social networks are distinct from in-person interaction. 
When it comes to law and regulation, the digital dichotomy suggests 
that virtual and physical interactions belong in distinct categories. This in 
turn forces scholars, government officials, and industry leaders to argue 
about what goes on either side of the line and what consequences flow 
                                                                                                                     
science can explain. See Kevin Werbach, The Centripetal Network: How the Internet Holds Itself 
Together, and the Forces Tearing It Apart, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 343, 346 (2008).
332. See SHAPIRO, supra note 331, at xiii.
333. See id. at xiii–iv.  
334. See id. at xiii–xiv.
335. See id. at xiv.
336. See supra Section III.A. 
337. See supra Section III.A. 
338. Others have used this term in unrelated ways, both in legal analysis and to describe 
business developments. See, e.g., Competition in the Evolving Digital Marketplace: Hearing 
Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Competition Policy of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th 
Cong. 39 (2010) (testimony of Scott Cleland, President, Precursor LLP) (using the term digital 
dichotomy to discuss how the internet, unlike traditional business, has moved away from 
competition to monopoly as opposed to the other way around).
339. Professor Orin Kerr makes a related point about the confusion between the internet as 
a virtual space and as a physical network. See Orin S. Kerr, The Problem of Perspective in Internet 
Law, 91 GEO. L.J. 357, 357 (2003).
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from that determination.340 Established rules were written for the old 
world of physical activities, so the new online analogues appear to exist
in a legal vacuum. The policy debate becomes a fight over whether they 
should be either “regulated” (under the old rules) or “unregulated,”341
despite the problems of such artificially sharp divisions.342 The question 
becomes which of those outcomes one fears the most. 
The fact that online businesses are new and operate in the ephemeral 
world of the internet blinds us to the ways that the behaviors and market 
structures involved are familiar. This, in turn, delays the inevitable 
recognition that the desirable outcome is a balanced solution that 
addresses the legitimate interests of industry, governments, and 
individuals. As cyberspace mediates more and more domains of human 
activity, the pattern repeats itself. Decades into the internet revolution, 
new business functions and social patterns are still making their way 
online. 
The emerging Internet of the World represents the final destruction of 
artificial divisions between the real and the virtual. Physical entities 
become extensions or information feeds for digital processors. The 
internet changes the delivery of services, even though those services 
occur entirely in the physical world. And it is no longer just large, 
centralized workforces such as Amazon’s warehouse employees who 
provide these digitally-mediated services; it can be individuals working 
part time on their own hours, enabled through online marketplaces. 
Where before it was possible to talk of a “brick and mortar” hotel 
chain such as Hilton competing against a purely digital aggregator such 
as Expedia, it becomes much harder to classify the ecosystem around 
Airbnb. Many of the advantages previously reserved for digital goods 
such as iTunes’ songs or Netflix’s movies are now available to physical 
goods and local services provided by humans. At some point, there is 
virtually no asset in a growing number of categories that cannot be 
                                                                                                                     
340. I have made a similar point about the siloed structure of telecommunications regulation 
in an earlier paper. See Kevin Werbach, A Layered Model for Internet Policy, 1 J. ON TELECOMM.
& HIGH TECH. L. 37, 40–44 (2002).
341. See Oxman, supra note 156, at 3 (arguing for continued internet deregulation).
342. See Kevin Werbach, The Network Utility, 60 DUKE L.J. 1761, 1764 (2010) (discussing 
problems arising from the FCC’s “all or nothing” approach to applying communications 
regulation to internet-based services); see generally Adam J. Kolber, Smooth and Bumpy Laws,
102 CALIF. L. REV. 655 (2014) (describing difficulties when laws create all-or-nothing 
distinctions). Not all cyberlaw scholarship operates in such Manichean terms. Lawrence Lessig’s 
seminal book, Code, for example, describes four forces that regulate behavior: law, norms, the 
market, and architecture. See LAWRENCE LESSIG, CODE 86–89 (1999). While cyberspace differs 
from the physical world because of the prevalence of code regulation (the cyber equivalent of
architecture), his point is not that one form of regulation is good and the others are bad; all forms 
of regulation have their place. Id. 
60
Florida Law Review, Vol. 69, Iss. 3 [2018], Art. 5
https://scholarship.law.ufl.edu/flr/vol69/iss3/5
2017] THE SONG REMAINS THE SAME 947
delivered on demand through digital systems. And in response, 
established businesses are turning over new digital leaves. Successful 
brick-and-mortar retailers such as Wal-Mart have long depended on 
advanced logistics, customer analytics, and other data-driven software 
systems.343 Now, in the face of the On-Demand Economy rippling 
through the transportation sector, even companies as decisively 
traditionally rooted in the physical world as Ford and General Motors are 
positioning themselves as software-driven “smart mobility” providers.344
The fact that on-demand services so thoroughly bridge the physical 
and the digital is what generates so much confusion and controversy in 
the area of regulation. The idea that digital systems are strange and new 
and different leads to the notion that they can escape the gravitational 
forces of established legal regimes.345 That same mental model leads 
others to see these services as threatening, unfamiliar, and directed 
toward undermining important public policy protections. Both idealists 
and realists assume that established legal and regulatory institutions can 
remain intact: The new services either ignore them or comply with 
them.346 Time and time again, the real outcome has involved engagement 
and evolution on both sides.347
The oft-repeated mantra that law and regulation move more slowly 
than technology should not be the end of the discussion. Both sides of the 
equation can be examined more closely. The practical effects of 
technological change are felt over a period of time, as the technology 
diffuses and broader segments of society adopt it.348 More importantly, 
                                                                                                                     
343. See Karl Flinders, Walmart’s Strong IT Will Be Key in Strategic Shift,
COMPUTERWEEKLY.COM (Jan. 11, 2010, 2:29 PM), http://www.computerweekly.com/
news/1280091811/Walmarts-strong-IT-will-be-key-in-strategic-shift (“Walmart runs some of 
the most advanced systems of any company in the world . . . .”).
344. See Steven Levy, Bill Ford Isn’t Scared of Apple, BACKCHANNEL (Jan. 10, 2016),
https://backchannel.com/bill-ford-isn-t-scared-of-apple-9822fd3ecb78#.6r0o86f68; see, e.g.,
Mike Isaac, General Motors, Gazing at Future, Invests $500 Million in Lyft, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 4, 2016), http://www.nytimes.com/2016/01/05/technology/gm-invests-in-lyft.html?_r=0
(discussing GM’s investment in Lyft and their plan to develop short-term car rental hubs across 
the United States).
345. Even John Perry Barlow, the avatar of an independent realm of cyberspace, now 
recognizes that his Declaration drew too sharp a dividing line between the real and the virtual: 
“If I were writing it today, I would make it much more clear that the Internet and the physical 
world are deeply connected in the same way that the mind and body are connected.” John Perry 
Barlow (john_perry_barlow), REDDIT (Feb. 8, 2016), https://www.reddit.com/r/IAmA/
comments/44srf4/im_john_perry_barlow_cofounder_of_eff_and_freedom/. 
346. See Cohen & Zehngebot, supra note 3, at 7 (noting the difficulty regulatory institutions 
have when attempting to regulate sharing economy businesses). 
347. See, e.g., Sofia Ranchordás, Innovation-Friendly Regulation: The Sunset of Regulation, 
the Sunrise of Innovation, 55 JURIMETRICS 201, 216 (2015). 
348. See Vivek Wadhwa, Laws and Ethics Can’t Keep Pace with Technology, MIT TECH.
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regulators can design legal regimes that provide greater flexibility when 
addressing fast-changing environments.349 The celebration of innovation 
should not obscure the principle that law exists to protect core societal 
values precisely because they do not change. 
B.  ICANN and the Dangers of Institutional Exceptionalism
The collapse of the digital dichotomy also undermines the arguments 
for new institutions specially designed to encompass online activity. 
Even when legislatures or courts adopt distinctive rules for new 
technological contexts, such as the Section 230 safe harbor for online 
services,350 they still operate within traditional procedural and political 
boundaries. By contrast, creating new institutions from scratch opens up 
a Pandora’s Box. The best example of the risks involved is ICANN, the 
Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers. 
One of the remarkable aspects of the internet in the late 1990s was its 
emergence as a platform for massive levels of commercial activity on top 
of a technical governance structure largely run by volunteers and groups 
of engineers. In particular, a single man, computer scientist Jon Postel, 
who had volunteered for the job years before, oversaw the entire 
addressing system that ensured that information got to the right place.351
Similarly, a small technology contractor, Network Solutions, Inc. (NSI),
got the job of registering domain names with the main suffixes, through 
a contract with the National Science Foundation.352 This largely ad hoc 
system eventually became untenable. Critics challenged NSI’s policies, 
its private control over public functions, its growing profits from 
registration fees, and the lack of attention to technical concerns such as 
security and depletion of available addresses.353 Organizations and policy
makers outside the United States also questioned why an American 
government contractor controlled such an important function for the 
global internet.354
                                                                                                                     
REV. (Apr. 15, 2014), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/526401/laws-and-ethics-cant-keep-
pace-with-technology/ (discussing the effect the printing press had on Medieval and Roman 
society over the course of centuries). 
349. See Ranchordás, supra note 347, at 201, 204–05 (advocating techniques such as sunset 
clauses and experimental legislation to overcome the “pacing problem” of law and technology).
350. 57 U.S.C. § 230 (2012). 
351. See MILTON L. MUELLER, RULING THE ROOT: INTERNET GOVERNANCE AND THE TAMING 
OF CYBERSPACE § 5.2.1 (2002).
352. See id. § 5.5.2.
353. See id. §§ 6.2.1, 6.2.2, 7.3.1, 7.3.2.
354. See id. §§ 6.3.1, 6.3.2. Some domain name suffixes, such as “.uk,” are expressly national 
and generally controlled by authorities in that jurisdiction. Glossary, ICANN, 
https://www.icann.org/resources/pages/glossary-2014-02-03-en#g (last visited Mar. 17, 2017). 
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Unlike most of the issues discussed so far, domain name management 
is inherently international.355 Because no nation has legal authority 
beyond its borders absent some voluntary arrangement such as a treaty, 
preemption of excessive regulatory action by other governments, along 
the lines of the Internet Tax Freedom Act,356 was not an option. The 
United States or other countries and private actors committed to the 
openness of cyberspace could not simply prohibit nations from 
interfering. Instead, they concluded, a new institution had to be 
constructed.357
In 1998, the Internet Society, a non-profit technical organization, 
joined forces with several other groups as well as the International 
Telecommunications Union (ITU) and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (WIPO), to adopt a memorandum of understanding (MOU) 
for management of internet addressing.358 On the one hand, the MOU, 
whose eighty signatories were predominantly private organizations, was 
an effort in the cyberlibertarian vein to remove online activities from the 
realm of territorial governments.359 On the other hand, because it created 
new organizations formally attached to the ITU and WIPO, both of which 
are treaty organizations comprised of nation-states, U.S. officials 
criticized the MOU for giving too much power to governments.360 While 
the United States had refrained from using its stewardship over internet 
addressing to impose content restrictions or other regulations on the 
internet, other governments might not be so hesitant.
In response, the United States rejected the MOU and began a process 
that eventually resulted in transfer of management over the domain name 
system and other technical aspects of internet governance to a newly-
created organization called the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names 
and Numbers (ICANN).361 ICANN is formally incorporated as a private 
California non-profit corporation, but it has a complicated governance 
structure that includes representation from various stakeholder groups as 
                                                                                                                     
However, generic top-level domains (gTLDs) such as “.com” have no specific geographical 
designation. Id. 
355. MUELLER, supra note 351, § 8.1.1.
356. Pub. L. No. 105-277, 112 Stat. 2681, 2681–2719 (1998) (codified at 47 U.S.C. § 151 
(2012)).
357. MUELLER, supra note 351, § 8.1.3. 
358. See Press Release, Int’l Telecomm. Union, Changes to Internet Domain Names Will 
Encourage Competition, Foster Growth and Stability (Apr. 29, 1997),
http://www.itu.int/newsarchive/press_releases//1997/itu-07.html.
359. See GOLDSMITH & WU, supra note 102, at 36–43.
360. See The Internet Domain Name System (Part I): Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Basic 
Research of the House Comm. on Sci., 105th Cong. 10–11 (1997) (testimony of Larry Irving, 
Assistant Secretary of Commerce for Communications and Information).
361. See MUELLER, supra note 351, §§ 10.1–10.2.
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well as national governments.362 The U.S. Department of Commerce, 
which succeeded the National Science Foundation, controls the critical 
contract with ICANN for management of the “root server” that all other 
name servers on the internet ultimately look to for valid addresses.363 Yet 
even though ICANN was a creation of the United States and depended 
on a government contract, the United States structured and promoted it
as an exercise in internet self-governance.364
ICANN thus represents the worst aspects of cyberlibertarianism and 
cyber-realism. It views itself in aspirational terms as an independent 
collective voice of the will of the people of cyberspace.365 Yet it also 
represents a naked exercise of power politics by the United States, which 
in turn sought to head off intervention from other governments.366 The 
result is an institution that lacks accountability and has lurched from 
controversy to controversy.367
Despite its frequent protestations that it is purely a technical 
management organization, ICANN has relentlessly grown its staff, 
budget, and scope of authority.368 Several times, there have been efforts 
to reconstitute or replace ICANN with an organization under the United 
Nations, or otherwise led by governmental representatives, who have 
only an advisory role in the current system.369 Various initiatives such as 
the World Summit on the Information Society, Internet Governance 
Forum, NetMundial, and World Internet Conference have advocated a 
largely government-dominated vision of internet governance in response 
to ICANN’s U.S.-centricity.
Most American technology companies opposed the efforts to 
decouple ICANN from its special relationship to the U.S. government. 
Their concern was that other countries with weaker protections for free 
expression could use a government-controlled ICANN to push for 
limitations on the free flow of information online. At the same time, direct 
interventions by the United States, as when it forced ICANN to delay 
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363. See id. § 9.4.
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plans for a dot-XXX top-level domain for pornographic material,370
continue to rankle those who envision a self-governing or truly global 
institution. The U.S. government is currently attempting to disengage 
from ICANN, though it faces arguments that it should continue this 
guardian role.371
ICANN’s most significant recent initiative is the unveiling of a variety 
of new generic top-level domains.372 The ponderous eight-year process 
involved forty-seven requests for comment,373 despite little evidence of 
real demand.374 Companies were required to pay a non-refundable 
$185,000 deposit to reserve new domains and substantial ongoing fees 
for those approved. The process as a whole generated tens of millions of 
dollars for the ICANN treasury but few clear benefits for internet users.375
ICANN illustrates what happens when too much credence is given to 
calls for new institutions and insufficient attention is paid to the 
potentially constructive role of old-fashioned government agencies in 
providing oversight, ensuring procedural safeguards, and playing a 
convening role for resolution of disputes. If the strategic purpose of 
ICANN was, like the Internet Tax Freedom Act, to employ the power of 
the U.S. government as a firewall against intrusive actions by other 
governments, it has at most served to delay and channel those efforts. If 
it was to demonstrate the potential of internet self-governance, it surely 
failed.376
An alternative to the ICANN approach of creating a new institution 
for innovative online activity is to enable private governance activity 
under the umbrella of public regulatory oversight. There are several 
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65
Werbach: The Song Remains the Same: What Cyberlaw Might Teach the Next Int
Published by UF Law Scholarship Repository, 2018
952 FLORIDA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 69
variants of self-regulation, co-regulation, and delegated regulation that 
free private actors from the inefficiencies of direct government mandates 
while still ensuring that public interest obligations are met.377 These 
approaches involve an active role for government, especially at the initial 
stages, in defining essential conditions and parameters, while giving 
market participants flexibility in the technological solutions they choose 
to meet them.
Both in the dot-com era and more recently, established governance 
and regulatory mechanisms have proven sufficiently adaptable to address 
new issues raised by innovative, fast-growing startups. Working through 
the issues for on-demand services will be challenging. The need for new 
flexibility and new rules should not, however, be equated with the 
inherent superiority of new legal institutions. Existing regulators, such as 
local taxi commissions, may be obstinate and captured by incumbents, 
but they are subject to procedural protections and political influences that 
may correct for such flaws. The way that Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb have 
gradually reached accommodations through local negotiations and state 
preemptive legislation suggests these factors can be influential when the 
startups are willing to come to the table. 
C.  What Cyberlaw Should Teach
Although cyberlibertarianism and anti-libertarian realism were major 
threads in early cyberlaw scholarship, they were not the only viewpoints, 
especially after the turn of the millennium. Another group of scholars, 
growing more prominent over time, offered more nuanced accounts that 
rejected the duality of cyberspace and real space, yet retained aspects of 
cyber-exceptionalism.378 Underlying this perspective was an important 
realization: The presupposition of the digital dichotomy was false. 
Cyberspace and real space were no longer distinct from one another (if 
they ever were).
The shift in scholarship mirrored shifts in the world at large. In the 
early days of the commercial internet, “going online” meant going to a 
computer at a fixed location, initiating a connection on a dial-up modem, 
and loading special software to request data from remote websites. 
Today, users are likely to carry internet-connected devices with them in 
the form of smartphones, laptops, and tablets; even the fixed-location 
computers use “always-on” broadband connections; every major 
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operating system and software application has built-in internet 
connections; and the line between “client” and “server” is increasingly 
blurred into “the cloud.” Google Maps, which with a single click changes 
between a computer-generated map and satellite imagery of the user’s
GPS-tracked real-time location, epitomizes this fusion of virtual and real 
in the second-generation internet.
In such a world, it became more and more difficult to suggest that 
online interactions did not have substantial spill-over effects on both 
personal and commercial relationships in the physical world, making 
strong segregation of their legal regimes untenable. At the same time, it 
became harder and harder to treat cyberspace as illusory and disregard it 
by applying longstanding legal principles.
A final contextual reason for the shift in internet policy was the 
broader bending of the arc of regulatory views, from President Ronald 
Reagan’s mantra that government was the problem not the solution379 to 
President Bill Clinton and Vice President Al Gore’s efforts to reinvent 
government380 to President Barack Obama’s defense of government’s
role in reducing inequality.381 The political and intellectual climates today 
are more hospitable to solutions that recognize both the legitimate role of 
government and the legitimate criticisms of government’s flaws.
The “post-realist” thread in cyberlaw scholarship goes back to its early 
days but was lost in the struggle between cyberlibertarians and realists. 
The same year as author Andrew Shapiro published The Control 
Revolution, Professor Lessig published an article in the Harvard Law 
Review titled, The Law of the Horse: What Cyberlaw Might Teach.382 The 
title referred to a debate between Lessig and Judge Frank Easterbrook, 
who had criticized the cyberlaw project as comparable to an effort in the 
nineteenth century to develop a “law of the horse.”383 There was, Judge 
Easterbrook argued, nothing inherently distinctive about the legal 
considerations for online transactions; established doctrinal frameworks 
such as contracts and torts would do.384 It was misleading to focus on the 
technological aspects in legal analysis, in his view.
In his article, Lessig defended cyberlaw with an early version of the 
arguments he would make more famously in his book, Code, and Other
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Laws of Cyberspace.385 The digital code of software and the Internet, 
Lessig argued, offered an alternative regulatory system in competition 
with state-defined law.386 Standards of transparency and overreach could 
be applied to evaluate both.387 In particular cases, software code might be 
more or less desirable than legal code in regulating behavior.388 It would 
be wrong, however, simply to ignore the technological dimension.
Among the valuable aspects of Lessig’s framework, which remains 
foundational even as other early cyberlaw work became a historical 
curiosity, is that it is not one of cyber-exceptionalism. Lessig granted 
Judge Easterbrook’s point that digital interactions were no different than 
real-space ones.389 There was no need, as Barlow and others advocated, 
for government categorically to “leave cyberspace alone.”390 Traditional 
legal rules should be employed where they are the most effective and 
socially desirable solution. In fact, by regulating activity without the 
transparency and opportunities for appeal built into formal legal 
decisions, software code was in some ways the more dangerous tool.391
In this way, Lessig avoided the digital dichotomy.
Extending the approach of The Law of the Horse to the current 
environment, both governmental and software-based mechanisms have a 
role to play in resolving the growing controversies about the on-demand 
economy. For on-demand businesses, the question is how to ensure that 
public policy objectives such as rider safety and consumer protection are 
met without the restrictive licensing and verification procedures existing 
regulators employ.392 Using Lessig’s two criteria, the question should be 
which mode of regulation is most transparent and least subject to 
overreach.393 Transparency can be thought of as a proxy for procedural 
fairness: Are the decision rules subject to evaluation and critique? 
Overreach is a substantive criterion analogous to Shapiro’s “overseer”:
Do the rules go farther than necessary to address the policy concern? 
Government regulation involves well-understood dangers, but non-
governmental regulation has limitations as well.
Latter-day cyberlibertarians claim that many of the market failures 
that previously justified regulatory solutions can now be addressed 
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through technology.394 For example, two-sided reputation and rating 
systems backed by analytics can protect both consumers and workers 
from abuses that previously called for government mandates.395 There is 
definitely some validity to this view. However, algorithms have their 
limitations. Sometimes they introduce new public policy concerns. For 
example, Harvard computer scientist Latanya Sweeney found that 
algorithmically selected Google AdSense advertisements returned ads 
implying prior arrest records more frequently for users with
stereotypically African-American than White names, even when those 
users had no criminal record.396 The algorithms were not deliberately 
biased, but they produced what might be considered discriminatory 
results.397 Researchers have found similar discriminatory effects in 
Airbnb’s reputation system.398
The problem with reputation systems, under Lessig’s criteria, is that 
they are opaque. Either the platform operator keeps the data private, or in 
the case of more sophisticated systems employing predictive analytics,
the platform operator itself may not know the matching criteria that its 
algorithms employ. If Uber or Lyft’s algorithms direct drivers to pick up 
White drivers more readily than African-American ones, there is no 
conscious decision by a human that can be subject to enforcement actions 
under anti-discrimination rules.399 In Lessig’s terms, there is a 
transparency concern with the software-based regulatory modality, which 
calls into question its superiority.
The proper response in such a situation is not necessarily to go back 
to the traditional solutions. It is to examine ways to preserve the benefits 
and efficiency of company-managed algorithmic reputation systems 
while avoiding the transparency problems. For example, Nick Grossman 
of venture capital firm Union Square Ventures sees the opportunity for a 
“Regulation 2.0” paradigm that shifts from ex ante permission to ex post
data-driven accountability.400 He proposes that regulators exempt on-
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demand companies from certain regulations if on-demand companies
provide a real-time data feed that demonstrates their compliance with 
public policy mandates and the opportunity for regulators to audit their 
behavior.401
Uber, Lyft, and Airbnb initially resisted requests for granular data that 
could assist regulators.402 Yet they have begun to change their tune as 
they recognize that voluntary disclosure may be superior to (and 
potentially head off) direct regulation. Airbnb has begun sharing 
anonymized data about its hosts with local regulators,403 and Uber makes 
trip data available to cities.404 This real-time information would also 
enable cities to engage in more sophisticated traffic management and 
other public services, as a side benefit of the regulatory deal.405 By seeing 
benefits in engagement with on-demand companies, local governments 
may be able to develop “win-win” solutions.406 Transparency can be 
addressed less intrusively through audits and reverse engineering of 
outputs on test data sets.407
A regulatory regime based on transparency of activity data is likely to 
be transparent as to its obligations (which is the sense in which Lessig 
used the term), as well as well-calibrated in its obligations. Data-sharing 
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alone is not a complete solution to the range of legal issues the Internet 
of the World generates. Its effectiveness should be judged in each context 
based on effectiveness in achieving well-articulated public interest 
objectives. The point is that there are more options than new companies 
ignoring regulation and regulators blocking their operations. Both sides 
of that debate are under the illusion of the digital dichotomy. Instead, 
regulators need to define essential goals through open processes and 
scrutinize new technologically driven means to achieve them. Even when 
these regulatory innovations involve significant private action, 
government involvement is often necessary. 
Twenty years ago, innovative new online services provoked a wave 
of cyberlibertarianism, a backlash of cyber-realism, and eventual 
adoption of creative solutions with government actors playing enabling 
roles. Technology entrepreneurs and their supporters eventually realized 
that government was not only a potential impediment to growth and 
innovation but a necessary facilitator of it. The same pattern is occurring 
now. Cooperation between governmental and private actors is starting to 
lead to workable compromises to address the important legal and 
regulatory challenges of the nascent Internet of the World. As much as 
digital technology changes the world, some things will always remain the 
same.
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